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ABSTRACT 
 
In this thesis, the Communal Land Rights Act 11 0f 2004 is analysed in order to 
determine whether it can give effect to the constitutional mandate in terms of 
which it was promulgated, namely section 25(5), (6) and (9) of the Constitution. 
Land policy pertaining to land tenure reform is discussed to see how and to 
what extent it finds application in the Act. The time-consuming process 
pertaining to the registration of the community rules is investigated, and the 
implications where a community fails to adhere to this peremptory provision in 
the Act are explained. 
The thesis also analyses and discusses the functions of statutorily created 
institutions, like the land administration committee and the land rights boards, in 
the efficient management of land in rural areas. The aforementioned land 
administration committee is particularly problematic, since the Act provides that 
in cases where a recognised tribal authority exist, that institution “may” be 
considered as the land administration committee, subject to prescribed 
composition requirements as contained in the Act. The Traditional Leadership 
and Governance Framework Act will also be discussed since it intersects with 
the Communal Land Rights Act in this regard. 
The pending constitutional challenge which relates to this potentially 
problematic issue, will be discussed. The constitutional challenge of the Act by 
four communities’ is explored in order to indicate just how potentially 
problematic the institution of traditional leadership could be. 
vi 
 
This study also discusses and analyses the compromise contained in the Act, 
regarding the registration of the land title of a community and the registration of 
“new order rights” in the name of individuals. In this context the impact of this 
process on the efficacy on the current Deeds registration system is 
investigated. The Ministerial determination and its constitutional implications is 
yet another issue, examined in this study. All of these issues will have a 
negative impact on the implementation of the Communal Land Rights Act and 
especially on achieving tenure security. 
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OPSOMMING 
 
In hierdie tesis word die Wet op Kommunale Grondregte 11 van 2004 
geanaliseer om te bepaal of dit inderdaad voldoen aan die grondwetlike 
mandaat soos voorsien in art 25(5), (6) en (9) van die Grondwet. Die beleid van 
toepassing op grondbeheerhervorming word bespreek om te bepaal tot watter 
mate dit wel in die Wet aanwending vind. Die tydrowende prosedure van die 
registrasie van gemeenskapsreëls word ondersoek, asook die implikasies 
indien ‘n gemeenskap nie aan die voorskriftelike bepaling voldoen nie. 
Die tesis bespreek en evalueer ook die funksies van die twee instellings wat 
statutêr geskep is, naamlik grond administrasie komitees en grondregte rade. 
Die twee instellings is geskep met die doel om van hulp te wees in die 
effektiewe administrasie van grond in die kommunale areas. Dit is veral die 
grond administrasie komitee wat problematies is, omdat die Wet op Kommunale 
Grondregte bepaal dat waar ‘n gemeenskap ‘n erkende tradisionele owerheid 
het, hierdie owerheid beskou sal word as die grond administrasie komitee van 
daardie spesifieke gemeenskap. In hierdie konteks is ‘n bespreking van die Wet 
op Tradisionele Leierskap en Regeringsraamwerk, noodsaaklik. 
Die betwiste grondwetlike kwessie wat tot op hede nog onbeslis is wat hiermee 
verband hou, sal ook bespreek word. ‘n Kort uiteensetting word gedoen van die 
vier gemeenskappe wat die Wet op grondwetlik gronde aanveg om presies te 
probeer aantoon hoe problematies die instelling van tradisionele leierskap is. 
Hierdie studie bespreek en analiseer verder ook die kompromis wat getref is 
tussen registrasie van die titelakte in die naam van ‘n gemeenskap en die 
viii 
 
registrasie van sogenaamde “nuwe orde regte” in die naam van individue. Die 
impak van hierdie magdom registrasies op die bestaande registrasiesisteem 
word ook oorweeg. 
Die grondwetlikheid van die ministeriële besluitnemingsbevoegdheid word 
breedvoerig bespreek in hierdie studie. Al hierdie genoemde kwessies mag ŉ 
nadelige impak hê op die implementering van die Wet op Kommunale 
Grondregte en spesifiek ook op grondbeheerhervorming. 
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
ANC : African National Congress 
CLARA : Communal Land Rights Act 
CLRB : Communal Land Rights Bill 
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CPAA : Communal Properties Associations Act 
DLA : Department of Land Affairs 
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NGO’s : Non-governmental organisations 
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SADT : South African Development Trust 
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UPLTRA : Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 
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PART ONE:  BACKGROUND  
15 
 
CHAPTER 1:   INTRODUCTION 
 
1 1 Research Question 
In this thesis, the tenure leg of the South African land reform program is 
analysed with reference to the Communal Land Rights Act.1 The purpose is to 
determine whether the current government is on the right track in providing for 
the needs of the landless majority in relation to communal land only.2 
 
1 2 Background 
South African land law has always been controversial on account of its divisive 
nature.3 Apartheid brought about patterns of landownership that were foreign to 
traditional land arrangements among African groups.4 Blacks were not allowed 
to become lawful landowners in a large part of South Africa.5 Because of the 
history of discrimination, many South Africans still lack secure title to the land 
on which they live or which they have occupied for a long time.6 
                                                 
1
 11 of 2004. 
2
 Mostert & Pienaar “Formalisation of South African Communal Land Title and Its Impact on 
Development” in Cooke (ed) Modern Studies in Property Law III, (2005) 317 317-318. According to 
Mostert & Pienaar tenure reform in South Africa is “lagging behind”. Cousins “Reforming Communal 
Land in South Africa” 2002 ESR Review 7 7-9. While Mostert & Pienaar do not offer any explanation as 
to why tenure reform is “lagging behind”, Cousins ascribes it to the complexity of tenure that exists in the 
former homelands. See Cousins “Contextualising the Controversies: Dilemmas of Communal Tenure 
Reform in Post-Apartheid South Africa” in Claassens & Cousins (eds) Land, Power and Custom (2008) 3 
4-5. Bennett “Customary Law in South Africa” (2004) 370 374. 
3
 This includes legislation such as the following: the Black Land Act of 1916; the Group Areas Act 36 of 
1966; Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 and the Proclamation succeeding the Regulations for the 
Administration and Control of Townships in Black Areas R293 in Government Gazette 373 of 19621116, 
to name but a few. According to Mostert & Pienaar “Formalisation of South African Communal Land 
Title” in Modern Studies III, the 1916 Black Land Act, the first racially motivated piece of legislation 
resulted in the exclusion of “black South Africans from dealings with approximately 87% of the 
country’s land.” Van der Merwe & Pienaar “Land Reform in South Africa” in Jackson & Wilde (eds) The 
Reform of Property Law (1997) 338 334-380. 
4
 Badenhorst, Pienaar & Mostert The Law of Property 5th ed (2006) 481-483. Nonyana “The Communal 
Land Rights Bill 2000 and Related Legislation” 2003 Butterworths Property Law Digest 7 7-9. Surplus 
People’s Project Forced Removals in South Africa, vol 1-5 (1983). Beinart & Dubow (eds) Segregation 
and Apartheid in Twentieth Century South Africa (1995). De Villiers Land Reform: Issues and 
Challenges (2003) at 45-47. 
5
 Cousins 2002 ESR Review 7-9. 
6
 Cousins 2002 ESR Review 7 7-9. Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law 2nd ed (2005) at 334. 
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Both the Final Constitution7 and the White Paper on South African Land Policy 
of 19978 recognise these injustices of the past. They stress the government’s 
commitment to the redistribution of land,9 restitution10 and tenure reform.11 
Section 25(5) of the 1996 Constitution12 imposes the duty on the State to “take 
reasonable legislative and other measures within its available resources, to 
foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable 
basis,”13 while section 25(6) provides that “a person or community whose 
tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws 
or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to 
tenure which is legally secure, or to comparable redress.”14 Section 25(9) 
places a positive duty on the State to promulgate legislation in order to give 
effect to section 25(5) and (6). Since these three constitutional guarantees form 
the mandate for the Communal Land Rights Act,15 the provisions for tenure 
contained in the Act must necessarily also adhere to them. 
 
                                                 
7
 108 of 1996. 
8
 White Paper on the South Africa Land Policy 1997 v-xvi, in the Executive Summary of this policy 
document it is eloquently stated that that the current land ownership and land development patterns in 
South Africa are a strong reflection of the political and economic conditions of the apartheid era. The 
racially based land policies were the primary cause of insecurities, landlessness and poverty amongst 
black people and at the same time it was also the cause for insufficient and unsustainable land 
administration and land use. 
9
 In the White Paper the purpose of the redistribution programme is said to provide the poor with land for 
residential and productive purposes in order to improve their livelihoods. It is specifically aimed to assist 
the urban and rural poor; farm workers labour tenants en also emergent farmers. Badenhorst et al The 
Law of Property at 594 also regards the redistribution as a facilitative programme that provides financial 
assistance in the form of grants and subsidies. Another main aim of this programme is the broadening of 
access to land. 
10
 The purpose of restitution programme according to the White Paper is the restoration of land and the 
provision of remedies to people who has been disposed of property due to racially discriminatory 
legislation and practices. Restitution as such can take any of the following forms: the restoration of the 
land from which the claimants were disposed; provision of alternative land; payment of compensation; 
alternative relief comprising a combination of the above mentioned or priority of access to government 
housing and land development programmes. 
11
 According to Badenhorst et al The Law of Property at 607 tenure reform relates to the amendment or 
reforming the specific form of land holding, where the emphasis are placed on the movement away from 
permits based approach to a rights based approach and by allowing persons to choose the specific form of 
tenure which is appropriate for specific individuals and lastly by the recognition and protection of de 
facto rights. This is also discussed in the White Paper on SA Land Policy vi and in Carey-Miller & Pope 
Land Title in South Africa (2000) at 456-458. 
12
 108 of 1996. 
13
 S 25(5) of the 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
14
 Bennett Customary Law in South Africa 1st ed (2004) at 423. 
15
 B67D of 2003. 
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Legislation enacted to give effect to the objective expressed in section 25(5) of 
the Constitution includes the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act,16 the 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act,17 the Development Facilitation Act,18 the 
Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act,19 the Interim Protection of Informal Land 
Rights Act20 and the Communal Property Associations Act.21 These acts share 
a similar purpose. They secure land rights for the people who were previously 
deprived of land. They all refer to “disadvantaged communities and vulnerable 
groups.”22 People without secure title to land, are unable to obtain loans from 
financial institutions, as they do not have anything to give as security.23 In this 
way, the lack of access to land has severely increased poverty in rural areas.24 
Indigenous traditions with regard to the status of women and their ability to 
control and use land aggravate the situation, particularly for vulnerable groups 
within communities already impoverished as a result of the unfair land 
distribution policies of the past.25 
 
Millions of people in the former homelands,26 “black spots” and independent 
states27 suffer unspeakable poverty due to their insecure tenure rights.28 
                                                 
16
 S 1 of the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 31 of 1996. 
17
 S 1 of the the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997. 
18
 S 1 of the Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995. 
19
 S 1(1) of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 112 of 1993. 
20
 S 1 of the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act 31 of 1996. 
21
 S 1 of te Communal Property Associations Act 28 of 1996. 
22
 See s 1(vi)(a, (b) and (c) of the 2002 Communal Land Rights Bill and Mokgope Land Reform, 
Sustainable Rural Livelihood and Gender Relations, Research Project of the Programme for Land and 
Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) (2001) 14-22. 
23
 Van der Walt “Property Rights and Hierarchies of Power: A Critical Evaluation of Land-Reform Policy 
in South Africa” 1999 Koers 259 261-263. De Soto The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in 
the West and Fails Everywhere Else (2000) 35. 
24
 Turner Sustainable development: What’s land got to do with it? Programme for Land and Agrarian 
Studies (PLAAS) Policy Brief 2 (Nov 2002) 1-4. 
25
 Pienaar “Broadening access to land: The case of African rural women in South Africa” 2002 TSAR 177 
182-192. Cross & Friedman “Women and Tenure: Marginality and The Left-Hand Power” in Meer (ed) 
“Women, Land and Authority: Perspectives from South Africa” (1997) 17 17-34. This point is also 
confirmed by Cousins (2002) ESR Review at 8. 
26
 The so-called homelands refer to Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei and it also included the 
old self-governing territories. These homelands were created in terms of the Black Land Act 27 of 1913 
and the South African Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936. 
27
 The six self-governing territories comprises of KwaNdebele, QwaQwa, Gazankulu, Lebowa, KwaZulu-
Natal and KaNgwane. The self-governing territories was established by the Self-governing Territories 
Constitution Act 21 of 1971, which was responsible for transferring certain and schedules and released 
land to the various territories. 
28
 See Cross et al “Women and Tenure” in Women, Land and Authority at 19-20. 
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Despite this, the original attempts to reform land control in these areas drew 
severe criticism from all spheres of the South African society, including affected 
communities, academics and also non-governmental organisations (NGO’s)29 
Up to at least 2004, the land tenure situation was much the same as it had been 
before 1994, especially with regard to communal tenure security. Many black 
South Africans still did not have title to the land on which they resided. By that 
time several possibilities were created to enable the acquisition of state land. 
For instance a Community Development Trust,30 or a Communal Property 
Association31 could be established. Yet, these options remained inaccessible to 
the majority. The requirements that had to be met in terms of these entities 
were tiresome and time-consuming. Most communities also lacked the ability to 
establish such entities without sophisticated support. Thus, most communal 
land in the former homelands still vested in the State. The people who were in 
peaceful occupation of the land merely had unformalised, de facto rights to it. 
More effective legislation was therefore needed to effect registration in the 
name of the beneficial occupiers and provide de iure rights.32 
 
The Communal Land Rights Act is the most recent addition to the legislation 
drafted in terms of section 25(5) of the 1996 Constitution.33 It is an instrument of 
the State that gives effect to section 25(5), (6) and (9) of the Constitution. 
Through this piece of legislation the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) attempts 
to give effect to tenure security, and redistribute state-owned land to its current 
occupiers. It specifically aims to provide access to land and secure title for 
those who live in rural areas, specifically in respect to land that is vested in the 
                                                 
29
 See e.g the responses to the 2002 Communal Land Rights Bill. 
30
 The said community development trust was to be established in terms of the South African 
Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936. Mostert & Pienaar “Formalisation of South African 
Communal Land Title” in Modern Studies at 319. 
31A Communal Property Association is to be established in terms of the Communal Property Association 
Act 28 of 1996. Bennett Customary Law in South Africa at 426-429. 
32
 Pienaar “The Need for a Comprehensive Land Administration System for Communal Property in South 
Africa” 2007(70) THRHR 557 556-570. 
33
 108 of 1996. 
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Development Trust.34 This admirable aim, which is set out in very specific terms 
in the Preamble of the Act, reads as follows: 
“To provide for legal security of tenure by transferring communal 
land, including KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama land, to communities.” 
Although the above quote from the Preamble of the Communal Land Rights Act 
merely refers to tenure security, it is still evident that there is an element of 
redistribution to the process of transfer. By transferring land to communities 
their rights and vested interests in land become secure because of the 
registration of it in the name of the lawful owners and occupiers of the land in 
question.35  
 
Tenure reform in this context relates to what Carey-Miller and Pope refer to “as 
the reform of the legal basis of landholding, usually directed towards the 
implementation of social change.”36 According to Mostert and Pienaar, tenure 
reform “refers to the reform of particular types of land holding and control, by 
moving away from apartheid’s permits-based approach to black land holding, 
towards a rights-based approach in terms of which persons should be able to 
choose the most suitable form of tenure for their own situations.”37 Van der Walt 
takes this definition further by stating that tenure reform is necessary especially 
because of the legacy of apartheid. The mere abolition of the various apartheid 
land laws, or restitution or attempts to improve access to land will be insufficient 
to address the inequalities of the South African land regime.38 Tenure reform 
according to Van der Walt is “aimed at land users who already have access to 
land, but whose land rights and interests remain weak or insecure because of 
                                                 
34
 The South African Development Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 was the successor to the notorious 
Black Land Act 27 of 1913. The latter made reference to the so-called ‘scheduled areas’ for the first time, 
which made exclusive provision for black occupation. The Development Trust and Land Act also 
provided for land for black occupation only, however these areas were now referred to as ‘released areas.’ 
See Davenport South Africa : A Modern History 4th ed (1991) at 176. 
35
 The process of validation and transfer of communal land in the name of individuals and communities 
will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5 of the study. 
36
 Carey-Miller (with A Pope) Land Title in South Africa at 456. 
37
 Mostert and Pienaar “Formalisation of South African Communal Land Title” in Modern Studies III at 
319. 
38
 Van der Walt “Constitutional Property Law” at 309. Van der Walt 1999 Koers 262-265.Van der Walt 
“Towards the Development of Post-Aparheid Land Law: An Exploratory Survey” 1990 De Iure 1 4. 
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apartheid laws and practices, including apartheid laws and policies that created 
or deepened problematic power structures in communal land use systems.” 
Proper legal recognition and protection is therefore required to render these 
insecure rights legally more secure and protected.39 
 
1 3 Purpose of the Inquiry 
South Africa was obviously in dire need of a revision of the inequalities relating 
to insecure and conflicting landholding.40 The Communal Land Rights Act was 
meant to be the main vehicle to achieve such a revision in relation to specific 
areas. However, this Act has proved to be controversial in many respects. 41 For 
instance, the Act provides for communities who can achieve tenure security 
without focussing on the difficulty of defining a community in the communal 
context. The Act awards the Minister of Land Affairs or his or her delegates with 
sweeping powers in relation to the allocation of land or comparable redress to 
communities. All these problematic issues and more will be discussed in detail 
in the rest of this study, to offer more workable solutions. 
 
The main aim of this research is to analyse the Communal Land Rights Act, to 
determine whether it in fact can be an effective blue-print for achieving more 
equitable access to land and better tenure security for rural people. Essentially, 
the analysis attempts to establish whether the Communal Land Rights Act lives 
up to the constitutional demands from which it originated. The compromise 
                                                 
39
 Van der Walt Constitutional Property Law at 309. 
40
 See Badenhorst et al The Law of Property at 585. It is estimated that about17 000 statutory measures 
pertaining to land holding have been issued until 1991 in order to regulate land control in relation to 
racial diversity. Fourteen different land control systems were in operation in the previous four national 
states, the said six slef-governing territories and the four provincial governments alone. This explains the 
complexity of the conflicting land rights in the communal areas. 
41
 Moos “Verblyfreg vir miljoene - Beplande wet sal tuisland-mense help” Beeld (2002-07-08) 6; Paton 
“New law to loosen tribal leader’s control of land” Sunday Times (2002-08-25) 8; Gerardy “Communal 
land rights laws rattle EC chiefs” Daily Dispatch (2002-12-09) 8; Cook “Land rights draft bill draws 
concern from some quarters” Business Day (2002-04-26) 3; Seria “Land bill no closer to resolution” 
Business Day (2002-08-29) 3; Mkhabela “ Tension over land rights bill” City Press (2002-08-25); Gutto 
“Rule of law crucial in land reform policy” Sowetan  (2002-09-02) 12; Naki “Land Bill assures land 
tenure rights” Daily Dispatch (2002-09-02) 3. 
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between the titling paradigm and fragmented use-rights as adopted by the Act 
will also be investigated, to determine its viability and efficacy. 
 
The premise for this study is the assumption that a legislative framework by 
itself cannot sufficiently achieve the objectives of the land reform program. 
Laws need to be backed up by effective government support as concerns 
funding, implementation and integrated development. On first blush, it does not 
seem as if the situation changed significantly since the advent of the new land 
regime. The annual budget for land reform is altogether insufficient.42 Hence the 
pace of delivery is not likely to increase.43 
 
1 4  Sequence of Chapters 
This study comprises of four parts. Part One consists of this introductory 
chapter and the following chapter, which discusses the framework, need and 
the criteria for reform legislation. This serves as the canvas against which the 
Communal Land Rights Act can be analysed. In Chapter Two the analysis will 
focus on the policy that gave rise to the Act. The Act’s drafting history and 
parliamentary process will also be discussed. 
 
Chapters Three to Six make up Part Two, which deals with the system put in 
place by the Communal Land Rights Act. Chapter Three provides a preliminary 
overview of the Communal Land Rights Act. It aims to establish the purpose; 
geographic coverage and legislative context of the Communal Land Rights Act. 
Chapter Three also investigates the link between the policy that gave rise to the 
Communal Land Rights Act and the procedure set out in the Act to achieve 
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tenure security. The policy choices referred to here are contained in the 1997 
White Paper on South African Land Policy, which are still relevant for land 
reform and especially tenure security in the context of the Communal Land 
Rights Act. Chapter Four discusses the acquisition of juristic personality by a 
community in terms of the Act. Chapter Five focuses and discusses the 
statutorily created structures in terms of the Act in relation to security of tenure. 
The Land Administration Committee is referred to as the “internal” 
administrative structure, while the Land Rights Board is referred to as the 
“external” administrative structure. The effect of the Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Act44 on the creation of said Land Administration 
Committee will also be discussed here. Chapter Six entails a study of the 
procedures for securing tenure. 
 
The substantive issues are discussed in Part Three of this study. It comprises a 
discussion of security of title, the registration procedure and the compromise 
between the titling paradigm and the fragmentation of land rights paradigm in 
Chapter Seven. Chapter Eight analyses the constitutional issues in relation to 
the Communal Land Rights Act. 
 
A summary of the conclusions and recommendations for giving effect to more 
efficient tenure security are contained in Chapter Ten and this constitutes Part 
Four of this study. 
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CHAPTER 2:   NEED AND CRITERIA FOR REFOM 
 
2 1 Framework for Reform 
The dire need for reform appears obvious from the preceding discussion, but 
will be conceptualised in greater detail in the following paragraphs. In order for 
tenure reform legislation to be consistent with the Bill of Rights, it must include 
measures which can address the deeply entrenched gender inequalities with 
regard to communal land in the rural areas.45 This chapter explores some of the 
policies that marginalised women in relation to land rights. The discussion then 
also deals with the criteria to which tenure reform must adhere, for the 
Communal Land Rights Act, which was mandated by the constitutional goal of 
tenure reform, to be implemented successfully. Security of tenure was the last 
part of the government’s land reform programme to receive attention; 
government was under considerable pressure to enact the much contested 
Communal Land Rights Act.46 
 
2 2 Need for Tenure Reform 
The submissions47 in respect of the draft Communal Land Rights Bill of 2002 
demonstrate the urgent need to address tenure problems well. Tenure reform in 
communal areas relates not only to social and economic development,48 but 
also to the eradication of poverty in these areas. Back in 2002, the uncertain, 
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insecure and conflicted tenure rights were constraints on investment and 
development.49 They also limited land rental and sharecropping arrangements 
and undermined the management of common property resources such as 
grazing fields, water resources and forests, which led to the unsustainable use 
of natural resources.50 The situation has not changed much in the mean time. 
 
Another reason why tenure reform legislation was needed, was the lack of 
clarity underlying land rights.51 This led to major conflicts between local 
government bodies, traditional leaders and communities.52 Traditional leaders, 
on the one hand regard communal land as land that they control, and 
development projects as a means to secure support from those under their 
authority.53 
Communities residing on the land in question, on the other hand, regard it as 
theirs. They want to be centrally and equally involved in decisions relating to the 
use and development of the land.54 Since the communities are the beneficial 
occupiers and users of the land, it is only just and fair that the land be 
developed in their best interest. 
 
The inherited land administration system, which was “in a state of near-total 
collapse in many parts of the country”,55 was another factor demonstrating the 
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urgency of tenure reform in communal areas. It is quite evident that a complex 
mixture of disfunctional land holding systems is in operation in the communal 
areas.56 Although rural inhabitants are in beneficial occupation of the land, they 
are still uncertain about the extent as well as the nature of their rights. Local 
and national political conflicts are an issue that is also clouding the land 
administration system in these areas.57 
 
2 3 Criteria for Land Tenure Reform 
Most importantly for tenure legislation to be successful, it must address the 
underlying problems with regard to communal land, tenure reform and the land 
rights of vulnerable groups.58 Its contents also have to be appropriate and its 
implementation effective. To confirm the Department of Land Affairs’ 
commitment to tenure reform, tenure legislation must also contain measures to 
back up the omission of or non-compliance with a provision of the legislation.59 
Several further criteria for assessing tenure legislation can be entertained.60 
The Bill of Rights requires that tenure reform legislation must include measures 
which address the deeply entrenched gender inequalities with regard to 
communal land in the rural areas.61 As indicated previously, past policies have 
also impacted negatively on the land rights of women in rural areas.62 
Another criterion is that communal land rights and land administration systems 
must be consistent with the Bill of Rights.63 This means that tenure legislation 
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has to adhere to equality by outlawing discrimination in whatever form and 
creating transparency and accountability in all decision-making matters. 
Transparency and accountability should be entrenched in the community rules 
and even traditional leaders should adhere to it. 
 
Tenure reform legislation should in essence be able to “create the basis for an 
effective and sustainable land administration system.”64 This will give rights 
holders, who are in the process of claiming, recording, enforcing and protecting 
their land rights, more effective support. The entire tenure security process 
must therefore be transparent to the holders of land rights in the area being 
administered. In general, the land administration system should be able to 
“reconcile and work co-operatively with local government bodies in relation to 
development, planning, infrastructural development and also the provision of 
much needed basic services in these rural areas.” Currently basic services are 
not provided to the communities in the said rural areas, impacting not only on 
their quality of life but also on their dignity.65 
 
The final criterion against which tenure legislation should be measured is its 
ability to be implemented on a large scale and to secure the land rights of the 
affected communities and individuals within a reasonable time.66 The 
Communal Land Rights Act will have an impact on millions of rural dwellers. 
The Act has been promulgated in 2004 already, yet it has not been 
implemented. Those in need of tenure security are still without it. The 
commitment of the Department of Land Affairs to the securement of insecure 
land tenure rights is for all the rural inhabitants, still merely a dream. 
 
                                                 
64
 Claassen “Land Rights and Local Decision-Making Processes” in At the Crosssroads at 132-133. 
65
 Claassens “Land Rights and Local Decision-Making Processes” in At the Crosssroads at 135. 
66
 Cousins “Submissions” at 38. Pienaar “The Meaning of the Concept Community in South African 
Land Tenure Legislation” Stell LR 65. Claassens “The Communal Land Rights Act and Women” in Land 
Reform and Agrarian Change in Southern Africa at 32. 
27 
 
2 4 Attempts to Address Need for Tenure Reform 
This section will entail a discussion of the efforts of the Department of Land 
Affairs to address the need for tenure reform. The relevant policy relating to 
land tenure reform will be analysed as well as the drafting history of the 
Communal Land Rights Act. 
 
2 4 1 Land Policy pertaining to Land Reform 
As already mentioned, the mandate for the Communal Land Rights Act is 
found in both the 1997 White Paper on South African Land Policy67 and section 
25(5) and (6) of the Constitution.68 The preceding chapter of this thesis 
provided an historical view of the tenure problems facing South Africa and the 
need and criteria for security of tenure legislation. This subsection now 
analyses the efficacy of the said land policy in more detail. This is necessary in 
order to determine in the following chapters whether the policy behind tenure 
reform indeed manifests in crucial legislation such as the Communal Land 
Rights Act. 
 
In the executive summary of the White Paper, much emphasis is placed on 
matters that must be dealt with in both urban and rural environments. These 
matters include the need for security of tenure for all, the need for sustainable 
use of land and also the need for the rapid release of land for developmental 
purposes. Other matters that need attention are the need for recording and 
registering all rights in property and the need for the administration of public 
land in an effective manner. All these matters receive some degree of attention 
and recognition in the Communal Land Rights Act. 
The aim of the Communal Land Rights Act is to provide tenure security to rural 
communities and individuals. It is hoped that by securing and registering land 
in the name of its occupiers, some degree of economic development can be 
achieved. The envisaged development can take a variety of forms, namely 
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eco-tourism in some areas, and fishing and agricultural activity in others. 
Regardless of the type of development, the beneficiaries must remain the rural 
communities and it needs to be sustainable. However the Communal Land 
Rights Act does not adequately focus on developmental issues, which the 
White Paper renders crucial in the alleviation of poverty and economic 
growth.69 
 
Furthermore the administration of public land, especially in rural areas needs to 
be monitored in an effective way. It has been recognised that since nested 
systems of land control exist in rural areas, abuse by powerful traditional 
leaders is a reality.70 ‘Nested systems’ of land holding refers to land holding 
practice in communal areas, where there is a degree of community control with 
regard to the allocation of land and landholding in itself. The household in 
communal tenure arrangements usually forms the basic unit of production.71 
Usually families and larger social groups have preferential rights to certain 
common resources, as derived from past practices. The tribal authority will 
usually be responsible for the allocation of land to new families within the larger 
social group or tribe. Despite the fact that communal tenure systems might 
result in strong rights in the larger social group, conflicting tenure rights also 
exist. Cousins and Claassens regard “’communal tenure’ systems as mixed 
tenure regimes, which very often comprise of bundles of individual, family, sub-
group and larger group rights and duties.” The type and content of the bundle 
of rights differ and depend on the natural resources available to that specific 
community and area. Nested systems in terms of communal tenure 
arrangements also imply that rights to land and natural resources are shared 
and relative. As such flexible boundaries between the various social units 
exist72 and this renders communal tenure even more unique. 
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The White Paper also recognises that tenure reform, and therefore also the 
attempt to provide tenure security to millions of rural dwellers,73 is a rather 
complex process due to past policies relating to land.74 The following principles 
guided the policy development process, namely: the movement of tenure 
reform away from permits towards the legal recognition of rights in land. Land 
tenure policy must also focus on building a unitary non-discriminatory system 
of land rights and at the same time allowing affected communities and 
individuals to choose the appropriate tenure system. The Communal Land 
Rights Act adheres to a certain extent to this policy, without relying fully on 
existing structures of land law.75 These relate specifically to the established 
registration system and the unitary concept of property. This is a rather critical 
omission, because both the White Paper and the Communal Land Rights Act 
assume that communities will know what the different tenure systems are and 
what it comprises of, but since communal tenure is so unique in the different 
affected communities, this assumption could have far-reaching implications. It 
can however be assumed that the reference to the different tenure system 
relates to the choice between individual tenure or communal tenure. 
 
Another important principle of tenure reform ensures that tenure legislation is in 
unity with basic constitutional principles.76 Providing that tenure systems must 
at all times be consistent with basic human rights and equality achieves this.77 
Other principles include the adoption of a rights-based approach and the 
adoption of adjudication principles for the recognition and accommodation of 
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“de facto” rights.78 One last principle guiding the tenure reform was that new 
tenure systems and laws must reflect current practices.79 
 
Most of these principles find application in the Communal Land Rights Act. 
However, there is room for improvement. In the following discussion, these 
policy choices of the Department of Land Affairs and how it manifests itself in 
the Communal Land Rights Act are discussed. 
 
2 4 2 Drafting History of the Communal Land Rights Act 
The Communal Land Rights Act was drafted with security of tenure in mind. It 
nevertheless also has an element of redistribution. Comparable redress can 
also be given in cases of conflicting rights which cannot be made secure due to 
circumstances. Many problems were experienced during the drafting stage. The 
concept of the Communal Land Rights Act was first introduced in 1995/1996, 
when the Department of Land Affairs still resorted under Minister Derek 
Hanekom. The initial goal was to transfer state-owned land to the communities 
and individuals who were residing on it, but did not have secure title.80 The bills 
that were drafted during this time were highly contested.81 
 
In 2000 Thoko Didiza took office as Minister of Land Affairs, which resulted in a 
new Communal Land Rights Bill in 2001. During a conference held in Durban 
on land reform issues in that year, the previous Communal Land Rights Bill was 
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discussed by various stakeholders and interested NGOs. Afterwards the 
attendants claimed that the consultation period with the drafters and the 
Department of Land Affairs had been insufficient, as they had not had adequate 
time to voice their criticisms against the Bill.82 The consultation process had 
also not included the potentially affected communities, but only the traditional 
leadership and other governmental departments.83 This led to intense 
unhappiness amongst affected communities, as they felt they were in the best 
position to discuss their rights.84 
 
Due to this criticism, a new bill was drafted and published for public comments 
in August 2002. However, because of the reservations expressed by academics 
and NGOs that this version of the Bill would not improve insecure land rights 
and because of the confusing administration arrangements it contained, no 
consensus was reached in Parliament. The Bill subsequently led to heated 
debates in both Parliament and the media. Consultations were also held with 
various potentially affected communities in Cape Town during the period of 12 
to 14 November 2002.85 
In 2003, these deliberations resulted in a shorter version of the Communal Land 
Rights Bill. Despite the fact that it differed drastically from the previous version, 
no further consultation processes were held with the affected communities or 
any other interested parties.86 This gave rise to great unhappiness and claims 
by the Legal Resources Centre acting on behalf of affected communities that 
the Communal Land Rights Bill was unconstitutional, as it did not give effect to 
the constitutional guarantee of public consultation processes. Despite this, the 
2003 version of the Communal Land Rights Bill was passed by Parliament early 
in 2004. 
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Some scholars87 have commented on the fact that the Act was rushed through 
Parliament, as an attempt by the ANC-led government to get the traditional 
leadership in the former homelands, self-governing territories and the former 
Ingonyama Trust land on their side for the elections of 2004. 
 
2 4 3 Parliamentary Process of the Communal Land Rights Act 
Dissatisfaction was also expressed about the Parliamentary process followed in 
the promulgation by the Communal Land Rights Bill.88 This is important in the 
context of the Communal Land Rights Act, especially since the Constitution 
provides for procedures that Parliament must follow for a Bill to get enacted. If 
Parliament follows an incorrect procedure, this would render the Bill invalid. The 
Constitution sets out three different procedures for the adoption of laws. The 
adoption of a constitutional amendment by Parliament is firstly prescribed in 
section 74 of the Constitution. Secondly, section 75 of the Constitution provides 
for procedures to be followed in the case of ordinary Bills not affecting 
provinces. Lastly, section 76 dictates the procedure for ordinary Bills which will 
affect provinces. It is the latter two procedures which are relevant in the 
determination of whether the correct Parliamentary process was followed in the 
enactment of the Communal Land Rights Act. The difference between said two 
procedures is how the National Council of Provinces deals with Bills.89 In the 
case of such a section 76-Bill, upon consideration in the National Council of 
Provinces, each of the nine provincial delegations to the NCOP has a single 
vote which must be cast as directed by the provincial legislature. Five votes are 
required for a Bill to pass. Where the NCOP considers a section 75-Bill each of 
the delegates has an individual vote. According to Murray and Stacey a further 
difference between a section 75 and 76 Bill, is that provinces have more 
influence over section 76-Bills and if the NCOP rejects a section 76-Bill, it can 
only become law if it is approved by the National Assembly by a two-thirds 
                                                 
87
 Pienaar & Mostert “Formalisation of South Africa’s Communal Land Title” in Modern Studies III at 7. 
Claassens “Community Views” at 42. Cousins “Submission to Portfolio Committee”. 
88
 Murray & Stacey “Tagging the Bill, Gagging the Provinces: The Communal Land Rights Act in 
Parlaiment” in Land, Power & Custom 72-91. Olivier 2006 Obiter 307-308. 
89
 Olivier 2006 Obiter 307-308. 
33 
 
majority. However if the NCOP rejects a section 76-Bill, it becomes law if the 
National Assembly passes it with a majority. 
 
It is common knowledge that every Bill must be considered by the two different 
Houses in Parliament; namely the National Assembly and the National Council 
of Provinces. In the instance of the Communal Land Rights Act, it was tagged 
as a section 75-Bill by using the Canadian pith and substance test.90 Parliament 
tagged the Bill as a section 75-Bill, because they found its pith and substance to 
be the provision of legally secure tenure by transferring communal land to 
communities or by awarding comparable redress. 
 
However it is evident from the Act itself that in essence it will be dealing with 
land and customary law, matters explicitly provided for in Schedule 4 of the 
Constitution. In the said Schedule 4 of the Constitution matters are listed that 
will fall within the “Functional Areas of Concurrent National and Provincial 
Legislative Competence” and which provide for land and customary law. As 
such the Act should have been tagged as a section 76-Bill instead. However 
Parliament only looked at the long title of the Act to guide them in deciding in 
terms of which section the Bill should be tagged.91 The tagging of the Bill as a 
section 76-Bill was proposed by the then Speaker of Parliament, Dr Frene 
Ginwala and the then Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces, Naledi 
Pandor.92 This would result in more extensive consultation with the provinces 
and it also would have meant a delay in the passing of the Bill, until after the 
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2004 national government elections. Despite this public outcry, the Bill was 
unanimously adopted by Parliament and passed using the section 75 route. 
 
The following chapter contains a preliminary overview of the Communal Land 
Rights Act, the structures it creates, its scope and the rights and relations it 
targets. It also places the Communal Land Rights Act in the context of other 
tenure security related legislation.  
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PART TWO:  SYSTEM OF THE COMMUNAL LAND RIGHTS ACT 
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CHAPTER 3:   PRELIMINARY OVERVIEW OF THE COMMUNAL 
LAND RIGHTS ACT 
 
3 1 Introduction 
The Communal Land Rights Act contains an exposition of the mandate to be 
found in section 25(5) and (6) of the 1996 Constitution. In the Preamble of the 
Communal Land Rights Act the following goals are mentioned: 
“To provide for legal security of tenure by transferring communal 
land, including KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama land, to communities, or 
by awarding comparable redress; to provide for the conduct of a land 
rights enquiry to determine the transition from old order rights to new 
order rights; to provide for the democratic administration of 
communal land by communities; to provide for Land Rights Boards; 
to provide for the co-operative performance of municipal functions on 
communal land; to amend or repeal certain laws; and to provide for 
matters incidental thereto.” 
The aim of the Communal Land Rights Act is admirable and noble, but it is not 
problem-free. The Preamble of the Communal Land Rights Act is in line with the 
White Paper on South Africa’s Land Policy, especially in the context of securing 
tenure. In the following chapters, the compliance of the current Communal Land 
Rights Act with the need and criteria for reform will be evaluated in greater 
detail. This chapter introduces that analysis. 
 
3 2 Geographic Coverage of the Communal Land Rights Act 
Section 2 of the Communal Land Rights Act deals with matters of application. 
The wording and structure is more concise and straightforward than that of the 
2002 Communal Land Rights Bill. It provides a clear indication as to exactly 
what geographic areas the Act applies. 
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Section 2(1)(a)(i) of the Act provides that the Communal Land Rights Act 
applies to State land, which is beneficially occupied and State land which vests 
in the self-governing territories93 or in any of the former Republics of Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana, Venda or Ciskei94 or in the South African Development 
Trust.95 The Act also applies to land that has been disposed of in terms of the 
State Land Disposal Act.96  
 
Section 2(1)(a)(ii) continues to provide that the Act applies to state land, as 
listed in the Schedules to the Black Land Act97 or the Schedules of released 
areas in terms of the Development Trust and Land Act.98 Section 2(b), (c) and 
(d) of the Act provides for the application of the Act also to the Kwa-Zulu-Natal 
Ingonyama Trust Land99 and also land acquired by or for a community 
irrespective of whether the land is registered in the name of a community or 
not. 
 
Section 2(2) is an umbrella provision with reference to the applicability of the 
Act. It states that “the Minister may by notice in the Gazette, determine land 
contemplated in subsection (1)(d) and may in such notice specify which 
provisions of this Act apply to such land.” 
Section 2 in its entirety is of a compulsory nature. If an area falls within the 
above-mentioned geographic legislatively regulated area, the Act applies. 
According to Mostert and Pienaar100 where the Act is applicable, the affected 
communities have no other choice but to adhere to its requirements in order to 
obtain secure and registered tenure rights. 
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This Act is accordingly applicable to quite a wide geographical area and for 
purposes of consistency this study will refer to all of the above-mentioned area 
as state-owned or communal land. Mostert and Pienaar regard the scope of the 
of the Communal Land Rights Act as very broad; “comprising basically all of the 
‘classical’ communal areas addressing the pre-1991 land regime, and applying 
“to beneficiaries of communal land and land tenure rights in terms of other land 
reform laws.” They also point out that section 2(1)(d) confuses the scope of 
both the Communal Land Rights Act and the Communal Property Associations 
Act.101 Section 2(1)(d) deals with the application of the Act to “any other land, 
including land which provides equitable access to land to a community as 
contemplated in section 25(5) of the Constitution.” 
 
The wide scope of the geographical area affected by the Communal Land 
Rights Act was therefore consciously inserted in the Act. This appears to have 
been done to aid more, if not all, rural communities and individuals in securing 
their land tenure rights. 
 
The Communal Property Associations Act is one of those acts attempting to 
provide equitable access to land to a community through the formation of a 
communal property association. The mandate for the Communal Property 
Associations Act is also found in section 25(5) of the Constitution. However, the 
Minister will still be able to determine exactly what provisions of the Communal 
Land Rights Act will be applicable to such a community. Practically speaking, 
this means that there is a possibility that a communal property association, 
established in terms of the Communal Property Associations Act, might also be 
subject to Communal Land Rights Act. Mostert and Pienaar opine that the 
broad ambit of the Communal Land Rights Act established by section 2(1)(c) 
and (d), can be viewed as an attempt by the legislature “to bring measures 
relating to tenure security and access to land under one hat.”102 
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One can also assume that due to the many dysfunctional communal property 
associations, a conscious effort by the Department of Land Affairs was needed 
to address the insecure land tenure rights in a more satisfactory manner. 
Although the aim of establishing a communal property association was to 
secure land tenure rights in the communal areas, the drafting of the community 
rules as a requisite for the acquisition of juristic personality by sophisticated 
lawyers, who were not always aware of the tenure arrangements of particular 
communities, did not help to secure tenure arrangements.103 The complex and 
utterly cumbersome process that communities had to go through in order to be 
regarded as ‘disadvantaged’, led to constraints on investments. 
 
In cases where a communal property association is indeed fully functional, the 
application of the Communal Land Rights Act could be to the detriment of the 
members of such an association, since the community will have to go through 
the painful procedure of establishing a new juristic personality all over again 
upon the registration of their community rules. The insertion in the Communal 
Land Rights Act that if a tribal authority exists in a particular area, they may act 
as the land administration committee, responsible for the administration and 
allocation of land in a particular area, may for reasons still to be provided later 
in this study, also be extremely problematic for affected communal property 
associations. 
 
3 3 Rights and Relations Targeted 
It is essential for purposes of this study to know exactly what the rights are that 
the Communal Land Rights Act sought to secure. The Communal Land Rights 
Act mentions “old order rights” and states what these could entail. These rights 
are insecure104 as a result of past discriminatory laws and practices.105 These 
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old order rights refer to the current rights of rural dwellers in the communal 
areas and how they are comprised. The Communal Land Rights Act attempts 
to secure these rights.106  
 Mostert and Pienaar107 argue that section 4 of the Communal Land Rights Act 
should be used as a starting point, as the constitutive provision for achieving 
security of old order rights is set out in this section. Mostert and Pienaar 
suggest that the term old order rights deals not only with rights that was formed 
previously and in the ‘old’ South Africa but also with (all other) land relations. In 
essence, therefore “old order rights’’ is a term denoting the insecure rights 
under the former, discriminatory land regime.108 
 
The Communal Land Rights Act regards as old order rights any tenure rights in 
communal land irrespective of whether the rights are registered or not. 
Currently, these rights relate to beneficial occupancy, usage in a variety of 
forms and renting of the land from the traditional leadership operating in a 
particular area. As long as the rights are derived from or recognised by 
customary law, practice or usage, it will be regarded as old order rights.109 
 
According to Mostert and Pienaar, the above-mentioned rights fall within the 
ambit of the Communal Land Rights Act if they existed immediately before the 
ministerial determination is made in terms of the pivotal section 18 of the Act. 
The said section 18 specifically deals with the conversion, confirmation or 
cancellation of old order rights into registrable secure rights, to which the Act 
refers as “new order rights.” 
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The Communal Land Rights Act deals with the conversion of old order rights 
into new order rights. New order rights are defined as “tenure or other rights in 
communal or other land which has been confirmed, converted, conferred or 
validated by the Minister in terms of section 8.” As can be seen from this 
definition, in order for old order rights to become new order rights, they must go 
through the process of confirmation, conversion or validation by the Minister.110 
  
3 4 The Communal Land Rights Act and Related Legislation 
In this section, the legislation that is applied concurrently with the Communal 
Land Rights Act will be discussed. This is important to understand exactly 
where the Communal Land Rights Act finds application within the broader land 
reform framework. 
 
3 4 1 The Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act (ULTRA)111 
The abovementioned act was promulgated in 1991 to provide for the upgrading 
and conversion of certain rights in tribal (and other) land into the Western notion 
of ownership.112 The rights that can be upgraded into full ownership are 
specified in Schedule 1 of the Act and include deeds of grants,113 rights to 
leasehold114 and also quitrent.115 In order for the rights to be upgraded, the land 
still must be surveyed, it must be informally demarcated and shown on a 
general plan, or it had to form part of a formalised township. It is also the 
responsibility of the Registrar of Deeds to affect the necessary entries and 
endorsements. The right to ownership is accordingly granted to a person who is 
the holder of any one of the specified tenure rights, according to the Registrar. 
As such, the holder of a land tenure right is regarded to be the owner of the 
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land, pending the conversion of the Schedule 1 rights. The holder will also still 
be subject to all the previously registered conditions, servitudes, mortgage 
bonds or township conditions. 
Schedule 2 rights such as permission for the occupation of any irrigation or 
residential allotment,116 permission to occupy117 or the rights of occupation118 
will also be converted into full ownership. This will take place when the owner of 
the land or erf lodge with the Registrar of Deeds a certificate of ownership, in 
the name of such a holder of the relevant land tenure right. The land here 
should be situated in a formalised township for which a township register exists. 
If the land is situated outside a formalised township, it must be surveyed before 
the conversion to full ownership can take place. Only once the land is registered 
in the name of the new owner, can ownership be transferred. This is exactly 
where this Act differs from the Communal Land Rights Act. Section 3 of the 
Communal Land Rights Act deals with unsurveyed communal land in the former 
homelands that needs to be surveyed before transfer to any community or 
individual household can take place.119 No mention is made of whether the land 
to be transferred in terms of the Communal Land Rights Act should be situated 
in a formalised township or not. It may, possibly. 
 
The Communal Land Rights Act repeals section 20 of the Upgrading of Land 
Tenure Rights Act. Section 20 deals with the transfer of tribal land to a tribe. It is 
Mostert and Pienaar’s contention that the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 
was amended by the Communal Land Rights Act in three respects. It provided 
for two additions to Schedule 1. These deal with more statutory forms of 
quitrent. Also, as already mentioned the whole of section 20 is revoked by the 
Communal Land Rights Act. According to Mostert and Pienaar the Upgrading of 
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Land Tenure Rights Act will still be nationally applicable upon the 
commencement of the Communal Land Rights Act. 
 
Despite the fact that the Communal Land Right Act revoked section 20 of the 
Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act, section 19 was kept. This is senseless 
considering the content of section 19. Section 19 provides that any tribe can 
acquire ownership in land, subject to a moratorium on the selling of any tribal 
land for a period of ten years after the commencement of the Upgrading of Land 
Tenure Rights Act. Since the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act was 
promulgated in 1991, the moratorium lapsed in 2001. This meant that after 
2001, tribal land that was acquired in ownership could be “sold, exchanged, 
donated, hypothecated or otherwise disposed of.”120 Section 19 seems to be 
unnecessary in the light of the Communal Land Rights Act, as all communal 
land is now dealt with in the newly promulgated tenure legislation. No other 
provisions of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act have either been 
repealed or amended. Particular focus is placed by Mostert and Pienaar on 
section 3 of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act, which deals with the 
conversion of land tenure rights mentioned in Schedule 2. They state that this 
provision still stands. The tenure rights mentioned in Schedule 2 are not rights 
that can automatically be converted into ownership, as they relate to 
unsurveyed land. There are also additional requirements for title to be 
individualised. The converted rights in terms of section 3 of the Upgrading of 
Land Tenure Rights Act into full ownership must be registered. Section 3 also 
sets out the procedure that needs to be followed for the land to be transferred. 
 
In section 3(1)(a)(ii) and (b) of Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act reference 
is made to the conversions being conditional on the obtaining of a tribal or 
community resolution. As such, the Communal Land Rights Act also deals with 
this extensively. Mostert and Pienaar argue that the tribal areas affected by the 
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Communal Land Rights Act and the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act are 
identical. Section 39 of the Communal Land Rights Act provides that “this Act 
(the Communal Land Rights Act) read with the necessary changes, applies to 
beneficiaries of communal land or land tenure rights in terms of other land 
reform laws.” Therefore it seems that the Communal Land Rights Act will 
prevail. To Pienaar and Mostert the continued function of certain provisions of 
the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act remains unclear, as it currently also 
provides for the conversion of tribal land rights into ownership. It is illogical, 
expensive and confusing to have two separate and yet very similar Acts in 
place. The operation and relevance of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act 
only stretches as far as Schedule 1 rights, namely the registrable right of 
quitrent.121 
 
3 4 2 The Communal Property Associations Act (CPAA)122 
The Communal Property Associations Act was promulgated in 1996 to provide 
an institutional framework for the registration and functioning of a new form of 
juristic person to acquire, hold or control property on behalf of and for the 
benefit of certain communities.123 The Communal Property Associations Act is a 
unique land reform tool and also a very useful mechanism in the overall land 
reform framework. Not only can it be utilised with great success in the restitution 
of land but also in the attempt in broadening access to land. The principles of 
justice, fairness and equality form the basic principles of the Communal 
Property Associations Act, as is the case with the Communal Land Rights Act. 
All communities who are entitled to secure tenure in the form of freehold 
ownership or only certain land tenure rights can employ the Communal Property 
Associations Act. Other state-assistance here includes communities that have 
been approved by the Minister as being disadvantaged for purposes of section 
2(1)(d) and (2) of the Communal Property Associations Act. 
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The registration of a communal property association (CPA) is dealt with in two 
phases,124 namely the provisional association is firstly registered after all the 
statutory requirements have been met. Thereafter the communal property 
association must be registered. The statutory requirements for the registration 
of both the provisional and the communal property association include the full 
details regarding the proposed name of the association, clear identification of 
any land or land tenure right or any other right that the association wishes to 
acquire and also a list of names and identity numbers of the potential members 
of the association.125 In terms of section 6 of the Communal Property 
Associations Act, a constitution needs to be drafted by the communal property 
association before the final registration of the association. This constitution of 
the communal property association must be consistent with the constitutional 
principles as set out in section 9 of the Communal Property Associations Act 
which include the following: fair and inclusive decision-making processes; 
equality of membership; democratic processes; fair access to the property of 
the association and accountability and transparency. In this regard the 
Communal Property Associations Act is very similar to the Communal Land 
Rights Act, as the latter must at all times also adhere to the said constitutional 
principles. 
 
The Communal Land Rights Act does not provide for any amendment or repeal 
of the Communal Property Associations Act. The Communal Land Rights Act 
has however very broad application, as section 2(1)(d) provides that the 
Communal Land Rights Act is applicable to “any other land, including land 
which provides equitable access to land to a community.” This provision 
therefore does have an influence on the continued operation of the Communal 
Property Associations Act, according to Mostert and Pienaar.126 Section 5(2)(iii) 
provides further that “despite any other law, when making the determination by 
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the Minister in terms of section 18, the ownership of communal land which is 
not State land, but which is registered in the name of a communal property 
association as contemplated in the Communal Property Association Act, vests 
in the community on whose behalf such land is held or in whose interest such 
registration was affected, and such land remains subject to limitations and 
restrictions in relation to and rights or entitlements to such land.” If this section 
is analysed it appears that the Communal Land Rights Act is also applicable to 
land that has been redistributed by the establishment of a communal property 
association.127 It is the contention of Pienaar and Mostert that because the 
Communal Land Rights Act also applies to communal property associations the 
community in question will for all purposes be the successor of a communal 
property association. However such a community will still have the same 
entitlements and limitations it had previously under the Communal Property 
Associations Act. This means that communities that have organised themselves 
into communal property associations already have secure title, but they are 
obliged to still undergo the process for acquiring land in terms of the Communal 
Land Rights Act. 
 
It is also uncertain whether this provision was meant to be applicable only to 
communal property associations that failed for some reason or another. Section 
5(2)(ii) of the Communal Land Rights Act does, however, make sense if it is 
kept in mind that many communal property associations have failed for various 
reasons and thus a new mechanism for attempting to provide communities with 
secure land title is needed and the Communal Land Rights Act could be just 
this. It is illogical that a functioning communal property association should 
adhere to the provisions of the Communal Land Rights Act if the Act in terms of 
which the communal property association was initially established, still has 
working force. According to Pienaar and Mostert “the provisions of the 
Communal Land Rights Act remain vague and nonsensical as far as the 
continued operation of communal property associations is concerned.’’ They 
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mention that it is unclear what the procedure will be that needs to be followed if 
the community that was originally embedded in a communal property 
association, wants to amend their original constitution. It is these authors’ 
contention that the section 8(10) amendment procedure as set out in the 
Communal Property Association Act, cannot be available over and above the 
provisions of section 20 of the Communal Land Rights Act relating to the 
amendment of the community rules. 
 
As the discussion above indicates, the role of the Communal Property 
Association Act is indeed questionable, especially in the context of land 
communally held under customary tenure, as was originally anticipated by the 
legislature. The Communal Property Associations Act seems to be only of 
continued relevance in situations where land is being restored to a community 
under the Restitution of Land Rights Act 128 subject to the formation of a 
communal property association as such.129 
 
3 4 3 The Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act (IPILRA)130 
This is yet another Act that aims to provide security of tenure. Although the 
protection awarded in terms of the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights 
Act is of temporary nature, it is of interest to land that is not adequately 
protected by any other law for the duration of the land reform process.131 The 
Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights Act was firstly intended to be an 
interim measure as it was supposed to lapse at the end of December 1997. 
Because of the complexity of the tenure reform process it has been extended 
on an annual basis. The aim of the Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights 
Act is to protect insecure rights, for example, unregistered communal land 
rights, held by blacks in the former homelands and the other affected areas. 
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The legal basis of these rights differ from those known in conventional South 
African property law. After the first democratic elections of 1994, it was realised 
that these de facto rights were worthy of legal recognition and protection. These 
insecure tenure rights are also protected in terms of the Interim Protection of 
Informal Land Rights Act against deprivation similar to that afforded to 
traditional property rights. Exactly what these “informal rights” entail, are found 
in section 1(1)(a)(iii) of the Act. It states that an “informal right means the use of, 
occupation of, or access to land in terms of any tribal, customary or indigenous 
law or practice of a tribe or it could mean the right of interest in land of a 
beneficiary under a trust arrangement in terms of which the trustee is a body or 
functionary established under an Act of parliament.” 
 
The Communal Land Rights Act does not repeal the Interim Protection of 
Informal Land Rights Act as a whole but only amended section 5 by deleting 
subsection 5(2) of the Interim Protection Act. Section 5(2) of the Interim 
Protection of Informal Land Rights Act deals with the date on which the Act was 
to lapse. However the applicability of the Interim Protection of Informal Land 
Rights Act seems to be redundant as the Communal Land Rights Act deals with 
exactly the same informal, unregistered rights in the same geographic areas. 
 
3 5 Land Policy and the Communal Land Rights Act 
As already mentioned the mandate for the Communal Land Rights Act is found 
in both the 1997 White Paper on South African Land Policy132 and section 
25(5) and (6) of the Constitution.133 Since chapter 1 of this thesis provided an 
historical view of the tenure problems facing South Africa and chapter 2 
addressed the urgent need for security of tenure legislation, this chapter will 
attempt to analyse the link between the said policy and the Communal Land 
Rights Act amongst others. This is necessary in order to determine whether the 
                                                 
132
 RSA White Paper on South African Land Policy at 60-70. 
133
 108 of 1996. 
49 
 
policy behind tenure reform indeed manifests in crucial legislation such as the 
Communal Land Rights Act. 
 
In the executive summary of the White Paper much emphasis is placed on 
matters that need to be dealt with in both urban and rural environments and 
thus also on tenure arrangements existing especially in rural areas in South 
Africa. These matters include the need for security of tenure for all, the need 
for sustainable use of land and also the need for the rapid release of land for 
developmental purposes.134 Other matters are the need for recording and 
registering all rights in property and the need for the administration of public 
land in an effective manner.135 All these matters receive some degree of 
attention and recognition in the Communal Land Rights Act. The whole aim of 
the Communal Land Rights Act is to provide tenure security to rural 
communities and individuals. However, the Communal Land Rights Act does 
not adequately focus on developmental issues, which the White Paper renders 
crucial in the alleviation of poverty and economic growth.136 
 
Furthermore the administration of public land, especially in rural areas, needs 
to be monitored in an effective way. Since the White Paper advocates the 
movement towards the recognition of a rights-based approach in communal 
areas, emphasis was in this instance placed on the development of a 
registration system for informal land rights in urban and rural areas. The 
following recommendations were set out in the White Paper, namely: 
i) the establishment and maintenance of a comprehensive land information 
system which would include alphanumeric as well as spatial data on land-
related matters;137 
ii) the collection and maintenance of cadastral and topographic information;138 
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iii) the establishment of norms and standards to structuring and managing the 
land information process139 and  
iv) the compilation of a comprehensive state land register which will be of aid in 
the management of the land.140  
In order to give effect to this strategy, the current registration system will have 
to be adapted to provide for the registration of group-rights as well as 
fragmented use-rights, as set out in the Communal Land Rights Act. A further 
discussion of the registration process will follow in Chapter 7 of this study. 
 
This overview of the mechanisms and focus of the Communal Land Rights Act 
serves to introduce the analysis in the following chapters of various elements of 
the Act that impact on the attempt to achieve legally secure communal tenure. 
In the following chapters, the land policy is scrutinized, the registration 
procedure as set out in the Act is analysed and the various statutorily created 
institutions such as the land administration committee and the land rights 
boards are examined.  
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CHAPTER 4:   ACQUISITION OF JURISTIC PERSONALITY 
 
4 1 Introduction 
Tenure security is one of the Department of Land Affairs’ main priorities. This is 
evident from the policy to replace permits and occupation certificates by 
individual title deeds and the subsequent registration of the land in the name of 
the rightful occupants.141 Section 3(1) of the Communal Land Rights Act 
provides that a community will be established as a juristic person only upon the 
registration of its community rules. As a juristic entity the community will be 
able to acquire rights and obligations in its own name in accordance with its 
community rules.142 As a juristic entity the community is now also in a position 
to acquire and dispose of immovable property and real rights143 and encumber 
the immovable property or real rights by mortgage, servitude or lease.144 It 
appears that the legislature wanted communities to realize that registering their 
community rules and the subsequent acquisition of juristic personality will 
benefit the community as a whole, as they are now entitled to do a lot more 
than was previously the case. This is also the legislature’s way of forcing 
affected communities to register their community rules, if they actively want to 
participate in the day-to-day dealings of their residual land. Non-registration of 
community rules will result in the default rules being applicable to that particular 
community. 
 
4 2 The Importance of the Community Rules 
The definition of the term “community rules” in section 1 of the Communal Land 
Rights Act is non-explanatory and merely provides that it “means the rules 
registered in terms of section 19 of the Act.” Nowhere in the Act is an adequate 
                                                 
141
 The 2004 Communal Land Rights Act sets out lengthy procedures before communities or individuals 
can become lawful owners of the land they resided on. 
142
 S 3(a) of the Communal Land Rights Act.  
143
 S 3(a) of the Communal Land Rights Act. 
144
 S 3(b)of the Communal Land Rights Act. 
52 
 
definition of community rules provided.145 The definition in section 19(2) of the 
Communal Land Rights Act leaves a great degree of choice to the community 
with respect to the matters they want to be regulated by the community rules. 
Section 19(2) is too vague and leaves room for the communities not only to 
abuse the community rules but to regulate matters that should fall within the 
scope of the land administration committee or the land rights enquirer for 
instance. When looking at the policy relating to allowing communities to decide 
on the tenure arrangements applicable to them, it appears that the legislature 
intentionally was vague in defining the matters on which a community may 
decide. This makes it possible for communities to include their preferential 
tenure system and what it entails in the community rules.146 Allowing greater 
community participation in the management of natural resources also would 
ensure that clear guidelines would have to be established by the communities 
themselves. 
 
Upon the registration of the community rules, they become binding on the 
community and its members.147 At the same time they will also be accessible to 
the public since they will be considered public knowledge upon its 
registration.148 The accessibility of the rules is sensible, since they are binding 
on an entire community and start functioning immediately. It is therefore only 
reasonable to expect communities and their members to inform themselves of 
the relevant community rules applicable to them. This should further not be a 
problem, especially since the community was indeed actively involved in the 
drafting of the rules. Relevant government structures such as local 
municipalities should also inform themselves of the relevant community rules. 
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4 3 Content, Making and Registration of the Community Rules 
Section 19(1) provides that a community wishing to register communal land in 
their name must make and register its community rules. These rules will be 
subject to other relevant laws. The fact that the Act is very unclear on what 
matters may be regulated by the community rules, gives the community more 
scope to decide on matters they want to have regulated. Section 19(1) firstly 
provides that the administration and use of communal land by the community, 
within the framework of spatial planning and local government laws must be 
regulated by the community rules. This provision is peremptory and it appears 
that here the community rules must include rules governing this matter. 
 
The community rules must also regulate “such matters as may be prescribed,” 
in the regulations to the Act. Section 19(2) provides that the community rules 
may regulate any matters the community deems necessary. This provision also 
seems to be in line with the policy principle that communities must have insight 
and a say in matters that affect them in whatever way.149 Not only will this 
streamline the functioning of the community as a juristic entity, but this will 
eliminate uncertainty in the management of the communal property and other 
natural resources. 
 
In order for the rules to be registered, the community is obliged to make 
application to the Director-General of Land Affairs to that effect.150 This 
provision places yet another duty on a community, which may not always be 
adequately informed of the procedures set out in the Communal Land Rights 
Act. This application for the registration of the community rules will also be 
time-consuming, since communities will have to wait for the decision of the 
Director-General before they could function as such. Tenure security at this 
stage still seems to be a mere distant possibility. 
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The Communal Land Rights Act does not provide any time-frame within which 
the Director-General must make his or her decision regarding the viability of 
the community rules. It does not allow the Director-General to refer the 
community rules to the relevant Land Rights Board with jurisdiction in that 
specific area.151 At this stage the Director-General need not even consider the 
rules, he or she only needs to refer it to the relevant Land Rights Board. The 
Land Rights Board must then consider the “suitability” of the rules and must 
lodge a report on this matter with the Director-General.152 Only after the Land 
Rights Board have considered the community rules and have reported on it, 
the Director-General is expected to consider the rules.153 Why do the 
community rules then have to be referred to the Director-General if he need not 
consider it? And why could the rules not be referred straight from the 
community itself to the Land Rights Board? This once again shows that when 
this Act was drafted, expediency of procedures was not high on the agenda of 
the legislature in securing tenure. The community rules will only be registered if 
the Director-General is content that the rules are in compliance with the 
Constitution154 and the Act.155 The actual registration of the community rules 
will be done by a Registration Officer of the Department of Land Affairs 
exclusively designated by the Director-General for this purpose.156 According to 
section 19(4)(c) the rules must be registered in the “prescribed manner,” but 
the Communal Land Rights Act does not provide any indication as to what the 
prescribed manner entails or where it could be found, neither does it contain 
any guidelines to this effect. The regulations are furthermore vague on this 
point. 
 
Section 19(4)(d) of the Act provides for the instance where the Director-
General is unsatisfied with the community rules on the ground that the rules do 
not comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the Act itself. As such 
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the Act provides that the Director-General must inform a community of further 
steps to be taken to amend the rules in order for it to be in compliance with the 
Constitution and the Act.157 It is obvious that the Director-General has an 
advisory role; whether he or she will indeed be aware of the exceptional 
circumstances of every community wishing to register their community rules is 
doubtful, especially since this Act is applicable to approximately 2.4 million 
households.158 Exceptional circumstances should be a factor that needs to be 
considered when the Director-General has to consider the suitability of a 
community’s rules. He or she must be made aware of it by the relevant Land 
Rights Board, having jurisdiction in that area. 
 
Section 19(5) of the Communal Land Rights Act contains yet another 
problematic provision. It reads: “Should a community fail to adopt and have 
community rules registered, the standard rules prescribed by regulation as 
adopted by the Minister to such community are deemed to be the rules of such 
community and must be registered as the rules of such community.” This 
provision is problematic for two reasons. Firstly it is peremptory. Secondly, it is 
arbitrary, as no time frame exists within which the community must register 
their rules. Every community should at least know what the time frame is within 
which they have to register their own community rules. More so the Communal 
Land Rights Act should have provided for this. The Minister of Land Affairs 
might try to justify this section by saying that only when a community fails to 
adopt the community rules within a reasonable time, will section 19(5) come 
into operation. 
 
The notion of sectional titles was the first type of formalised communal living 
and so provides a useful measure of comparison for the Communal Land 
Rights Act. This analysis does not propose to be full scale comparison with the 
Sectional Titles Act but where the comparison can aid an understanding of the 
Communal Land Rights Act, this will be considered. For example, the Sectional 
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Titles Act159 provides for default management rules where a sectional title 
scheme does not register its own rules. As is the case with the community 
rules of the Communal Land Rights Act, the rules in sectional title schemes are 
essential in achieving harmony in communities.160 The Communal Land Rights 
Act provides for one set of default community rules, whereas the Sectional Title 
Scheme provides for two sets of rules, namely the management rules161 and 
the conduct rules.162 
Different communities also might have very distinct circumstances, as 
mentioned previously. It is therefore doubtful whether the standard set of rules 
in the regulations will be able to address all of these issues adequately. 
 
4 4 Amending and Revocation of the Community Rules 
Section 20 deals with the amendment and revocation of the community rules. 
More specifically section 20(1) provides that a community may amend or 
revoke any community rules at a general meeting. The said amendment or 
revocation will only become effective on the subsequent registration to that 
effect. Problematic here is the question of whether section 20 applies to 
scenarios where the community drafted its own rules or where their omission 
led to the standard rules to be applicable depending on the discretion of the 
Minister. 
 
If section 20 is applicable to the latter section, section 19(5) is unnecessary as 
a community may revoke the standard rules at a general meeting. 
Nevertheless they will have to go through the whole time-consuming procedure 
of getting their own set of community rules registered. Also the designated 
registration officer will have to register yet another set of community rules for 
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the same community. This in itself may lead to uncertainty amongst community 
members as to exactly what the applicable rules are. At this point in the 
Communal Land Rights Act the legislature should have included a provision to 
the effect that if an amendment or revocation of any community rules does 
occur, it must be published in a local newspaper, in a language understood and 
spoken by the affected community or by using any other appropriate medium in 
order for the applicable rules to be regarded as public knowledge.163 
The Communal Land Rights Act provision relating to the amendment and 
revocation of community rules differ from that of the provisions in the Sectional 
Titles Act.164 This distinction relate to the fact that two types of rules are 
contained in the latter Act, namely the management rules and the conduct 
rules. With regard to the substitution, adding to, amendment or revocation of 
the management rules, this will only be possible by the unanimous resolution of 
the body corporate of that particular scheme.165 It will only be possible to 
substitute, add to, amend or revoke the conduct rules by special resolution of 
the body corporate.166  
 
By way of conclusion, it is apparent that the time-consuming nature surrounding 
the drafting and consideration phase of community rules will not aid tenure 
security or decrease the vulnerability of rural inhabitants. The illiteracy level of 
rural inhabitants is yet another factor that should have been given due 
consideration in drafting the Act; for this may impact on the participation of 
community members in the drafting process of the community rules. The 
process can be more expedient if proper time-frames were provided for in the 
Act, within which the community rules and the subsequent approval have to 
take place. The Communal Land Rights Act should have included effective 
sanctions for non-compliance with the time-frames. 
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CHAPTER 5:   STRUCTURES GIVING EFFECT TO POLICY 
BEHIND THE COMMUNAL LAND RIGHTS ACT 
 
5 1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the roles and functions of the various administrative 
structures required by the Communal Land Rights Act.167 One of these 
structures is the land administration committee,168 acting as an executive organ 
of a particular community. This committee is the body through which 
communities act, as its members are elected by the community to represent 
them in all relevant matters in the process of becoming legal landowners.169 
The Communal Land Rights Act introduces the innovation of Land Rights 
Boards170 and the Land Rights Enquirer.171 The first-mentioned Land Rights 
Boards172 will have input in the decisions of the Minister of Land-Affairs, with 
regard to certain issues, such as the registration of the community rules. The 
Land Rights Enquirer will be an official of the Department of Land Affairs and 
will be responsible for investigating the validity of old order rights, conflicting 
land rights and for submitting a report about this to the Minister for further 
determination. 
 
5 2 “Internal” Administrative Organ: Land Administration 
Committee 
This administrative structure is very similar to the body corporate in a sectional 
title scheme. Through registration as an owner of a sectional title unit,173 a 
person automatically becomes a member of the body corporate. The body 
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corporate is responsible for the control and administration of the common parts 
of the sectional title development. According to van der Merwe and annexure 8 
rule 4(1) and s 39(1) of the Sectional Titles Act,174 “owners acquire the right to 
take part in the general meetings of the association and to elect the trustees 
who act as the executive organ of the association.” Van der Merwe however 
writes that it is difficult to classify this association from a dogmatic point of view, 
a problem that relates to the question “whether the body corporate is endowed 
with legal personality separate from its members.”175 
Like bodies corporate, administrative structures appear to have their own 
peculiar characteristics, which make them different from other ordinary 
voluntary associations of the common law. 
 
5 2 1 Establishment of a Land Administration Committee 
The definition of land administration committee refers one back to section 21, 
which is the section establishing the committee. The establishment of a Land 
Administration Committee is yet another highly contested provision. Section 
21(2) provides that if a community has a recognised traditional council, this 
council may exercise and perform the function of the Land Administration 
Committee. The use of the “may” in this context is ambiguous.176  
 
Research conducted in communal areas shows that there is an increasing 
breakdown of customary management arrangements.177 This leads to even 
more uncertainty relating to the rights of rural inhabitants and confusion as to 
exactly who is responsible for the management of communal land: is it the local 
municipality of that particular area, or unelected traditional authorities? These 
are only a few of the burning questions attempted to be addressed by the 
Communal Land Rights Act. Land management is also plagued in the 
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communal areas by political conflicts amongst rural dwellers over conflicting 
land rights. Therefore the creation of a Land Administration Committee178 in 
securing tenure comes as no surprise. However, the legislature decided to put 
the managerial task in the hands of traditional authorities, where they exist in 
communal areas. This issue will be discussed in greater detail, as it has the 
potential for causing serious discontent. 
 
According to section 21(1) a community will be responsible for the 
establishment of a Land Administration Committee. The composition of the 
said Land Administration Committee will also be discussed in this chapter. No 
rationale is provided for in the Memorandum to the Act as to why such a Land 
Administration Committee needs to be established. A possible reason could be 
that it could promote the restoration of the land management in communal 
areas as well as the day to day functioning of communities. Section 21(1) deals 
with the disestablishment of the Land Administration Committee before even 
discussing the establishment of it. This renders the Act clumsy and ill-
considered. 
 
Section 21(1) provides that the Land Administration Committee may only be 
“disestablished” once its existence is no longer required by the Communal 
Land Rights Act. The Act does however not say when this will be the case. 
This raises the question who will be responsible for the management of 
communal land once the Land Administration Committee is disestablished? It 
seems here that the legislature incorrectly assumed that all rural inhabitants 
will in due course acquire individual ownership. In cases where communities 
wish to abide by traditional arrangements familiar to them, they are allowed to 
choose the tenure arrangements best suited for them according to the White 
Paper, and this might very well include the nested arrangement of communal 
landholding. 
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5 2 2 Difficulties with provisions relating to the Land Administration 
Committee 
The most problematic arrangement relating to the Land Administration 
Committee is found in section 21(2), which provides as follows: “If a community 
has a recognised traditional council, the powers and duties of the land 
administration committee of such a community may be exercised and 
performed by such a council.” This is a whole new approach to the 
management of communal land, compared to the initial provision in the 2003 
Communal Land Rights Bill. The latter was not without any criticism; the 
insertion of section 21(2) in the Act, resulted in fierce criticism from NGO’s and 
land activists. Not only was this insertion an unexpected surprise for NGO’s 
and land activists, but it also confirmed government’s insensitivity towards or 
ignorance of the abuse by traditional authorities. In communal areas control 
over land has always been seen as the power base of traditional authorities.179 
By strengthening this notion, the system might be prone to more abuse. The 
main point of criticism levelled against a traditional authority becoming the 
Land Administration Committee was the fact that they were unelected and that 
women had no membership or voice in traditional authorities. A discussion on 
this will follow under the next heading. 
In opposing section 21(2) - (4), civil society’s contention was that by allowing 
traditional council to be the Land Administration Committee where they existed 
in communal areas, fundamental democratic rights will be undermined.180 A 
brief historical overview of the institution of traditional authority in communal 
areas is necessitated by section 21(2). The functionality in communal areas 
and why they enjoy the prestige and respect that they have, will be examined. 
The continued existence of traditional authorities is by no means threatened, 
but protected by the recently promulgated Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Act.181 
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Section 21(3) is closely linked to section 21(2), in that it provides that in 
exercising their powers and duties, a traditional council must ensure that the 
composition satisfies the requirements of representation by women, as set out 
in the Communal Land Rights Act. However no sanction is introduced should a 
Land Administration Committee not adhere to this requirement. This could be 
an indication to traditional authorities that despite the insertion of section 21(2), 
government is not serious enough about gender equity in achieving tenure 
security. 
 
5 2 3 Land Administration Committee and Traditional Leaders 
The legislature intended to limit the functionality of the traditional leadership, 
where they were recognised as the relevant Land Administration Committee.182 
Section 21(4) explicitly provides that in the above-mentioned cases the 
traditional authority functional area of competence will be the administration of 
land affairs and not that of traditional leadership as set out in the recently 
enacted Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act,183 and 
Schedule 4 of the 1996 Constitution.184 As an afterthought, the legislature 
inserted section 21(5), providing that any provision in the Communal Land 
Rights Act referring to a traditional council has the intention to “establish norms 
and standards and a national policy with regard to communal land rights, to 
effect unity across the nation.” How unity is to be affected by the insertion of 
section 21(2) is unclear, especially since there was great unhappiness when 
rural inhabitants first became aware of it. This is also evident in the many 
submissions on the 2003 Communal Land Rights Bill.185 
 
When discussing or referring to traditional authorities it is important to take note 
of the rationale for their establishment in the first instance. The Bantu 
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Authorities Act186 was introduced in 1951 in an attempt to prepare black South 
Africans to become self-governing and independent, while still under the 
authority of these institutions. Prior to 1994 no distinction existed between land 
ownership, land administration and land management. All these land related 
matters were vested in and the responsibility of the State. During the Apartheid 
years however these responsibilities shifted to tribal authorities, who were 
responsible for service delivery and land allocation in the rural areas, since no 
local municipalities existed in these areas. However the White Paper on the 
South African Land Policy are once again shifting this responsibility in a more 
transparent way to a variety of stakeholders, which includes the respective 
traditional authorities and local governments, i.e municipalities being elected by 
rural inhabitants.187  
 
A traditional authority in the context of this study refers to a chief, who has 
jurisdiction over rural inhabitants in a particular area. These chiefs188 were 
responsible for a small to medium size group of people, known as a tribe. 
Larger groups also exist and are governed by a paramount chief or inkumnani. 
The chiefs could also delegate their responsibilities and certain functions to 
‘smaller chiefs’ or headmen.189 During the late 1980’s, resentment amongst the 
paramount chiefs, chiefs and headmen arose, and they started to regard these 
titles as “pejorative,” as it was awarded to them by colonialists during the 
previous political dispensation. From then onwards they embraced the all 
encompassing term of “traditional authority.”190 
 
The recognition of traditional authority was influenced by a range of factors, 
which includes the following: the rural society is of such a nature that people 
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grew up with this institution and are accustomed to them.191 For a long time 
they were the only structures through which rural dwellers were able to access 
certain benefits including the acquisition of land and the renewal of contracts 
for migrant workers and also the application of social grants such as pensions 
for the elderly and grants awarded to children who would qualify for it.192 A 
second factor influencing the recognition of traditional authorities was the role 
the ANC193 played in its continued existence in an attempt to secure their 
support at the forehand of the peace talks in the early 1990’s between the then 
NP194 ruling government and the majority represented ANC.195 At the same 
time the ANC realized that since the majority of black South Africans resided in 
the communal rural areas, under the chieftaincy of these traditional authorities, 
due recognition were to be awarded to them in every possible way.  
 
Despite the role traditional authorities are to play in communal areas, recent 
developments in land tenure policy show that land ownership is to be 
separated from governance, which was previously one of the key functions of 
the traditional authority. This is also evident in older legislation such as the 
Communal Property Associations Act where an accountable land holding 
institution, a Communal Property Association is to be established, as a model 
for group ownership. The scope of the Communal Land Rights Act is similar to 
the Communal Property Associations Act, in that the State will be transferring 
ownership to communities and individuals, while the land is to be administered 
according to the wishes of the respective communities. Neither traditional 
authorities nor local government institutions will be the nominal owner of the 
land, but will have other functions to fulfil. However, both institutions may 
allocate land, if they are requested to do so by a community and this notion is 
recognised by the Department of Land Affairs, according to Thomas.196  
                                                 
191
 Ntsebeza “Traditional Authorities” in At the Crossroads at 282-284. 
192
 Ntsebeza “Traditional Authorities” in At the Crossroads at 290. 
193
 African National Congress.  
194
 National Party. 
195
 Ntsebeza “Traditional Authorities” in At the Crossroads at 291. 
196
 Thomas, Sibanda & Claassens Current Developments in South Africa’s Land Tenure Policy 1998, 
Memo issued by the Department of Land Affairs.. 
66 
 
 
5 2 3 1 Role, Powers and Functions of the Traditional Authority: 
Historical Overview 
A brief historical overview of the traditional leadership is necessary to shed 
some light on their inclusion in administering communal land. Prior to 1994, no 
distinction existed between land ownership, administration and land 
management. However all these land related issues were the responsibility of 
the State. During the Apartheid years it was the responsibility of the infamous 
traditional authorities.197 The land administration in the rural areas differed from 
that in urban areas, in that in the latter areas it was and still is the responsibility 
of municipalities, who are elected councillors. Municipalities did not exist in 
rural areas but this changed after 1994, due to section 151(1) of the 
Constitution, which provides that the local sphere of government consists of 
municipalities. Municipalities therefore had to be established for the whole of 
South Africa, including the rural areas. 
 
Before colonial invasion South African traditional authorities inherited their 
title.198 After colonial conquests and widespread land dispossessions this 
changed, since opposing traditional authorities, who were defeated, were then 
to be ruled by an adapted version of African ruling, namely “native 
administration” based on chieftaincy.199 The chiefs, who opposed this move, 
were replaced by willing and compliant chiefs, who were accordingly selected 
by the colonial rulers. The hereditary acquisition of the traditional authority title 
was no longer possible since the ruling government started appointing them.200 
After the National Party government came into power in 1948, they introduced 
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the Bantu Administration Act201 In order to solve the issue of “native 
administration” and at the same time, to ensure that the traditional authorities 
were once again in charge of the land management in the rural areas, at all 
levels of civil rural society. 
 
The traditional authorities were linked to government by the Department of 
Native Affairs in the early 1960’s and many regarded them as the “messengers 
of government will.”202 The Minister of Native Affairs had wide powers. He 
could demote any chief, or even cancel the appointment of any officer of the 
traditional authority and he could also allocate any powers he deemed 
necessary to an appointed chief or officer. Once again, new chieftaincy 
lineages were created and had to be recognised by rural inhabitants. 
 
Nevertheless, during all this time corruption and repression by the traditional 
authorities were at the order of the day.203 This was especially evident in the 
powers they had relating to land allocation in the rural areas, since no 
application for land could be lodged without their signature.204 This power was 
gravely abused by traditional authorities in that they charged “unauthorised 
fees,”205 because they knew they were the only instrument through which 
households were able to acquire land in the rural areas. Traditional authorities 
also abused their powers in state pensions, tribal courts and even migrant 
labour applications. In the case of state pensions, senior citizens have to be in 
possession of a letter from a traditional authority stating that they reside in a 
area under his jurisdiction. When elderly people refused to pay the 
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“unauthorised fees,” the traditional authority would refuse to issue such letters, 
leaving elderly people to their own devises.206 
It is therefore quite surprising that the traditional authorities were recognised 
after apartheid and during the transition to democracy. In the late 1980’s and 
early 1990’s widespread mass mobilization occurred. This resulted in pleas for 
the abolition of these traditional authorities in favour of more democratically 
elected societies.207 Rural inhabitants started drawing a distinction between, 
what they called “genuine” traditional authorities and “illegitimate” traditional 
authorities.208 The former had the best interest of rural habitants at heart, 
whereas the latter were those guilty of corruption and oppression. To a certain 
extent the unhappiness in the rural areas relating to the traditional authorities 
also directly resulted in the collapse of the land management in these areas.209 
 
The following factors contribute to the current recognition of traditional 
authorities. First the traditional authorities were the only mechanism through 
which members of the rural society could acquire pivotal benefits, and 
therefore their powers were never questioned. Ntsebeza contends that due to 
migratory labour practices and lack of job opportunities in these areas, young 
and educated people were forced to seek better job opportunities outside of 
these areas. As a result, the only inhabitants left were married women with 
children and retired elderly men and women. Ntsebeza further contends that 
since these inhabitants are not always aware of their rights in respect of land 
and state benefits, they are not willing to challenge the institution of traditional 
leadership.210 Traditional leaders are willing to trample on the land rights of 
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beneficiaries, even where they have acquired the land through the restitution 
process.211  
 
The second factor that contributed to the current and ongoing recognition of 
traditional authorities was the position of the ANC towards traditional 
authorities.212 The ANC always fought for a democratic unitary state, so why 
would they “embrace the institution of traditional leadership?”213 Ntsebeza 
provides three factors that led to what he calls the re-emergence of the 
traditional leadership as a political force. Firstly, the policies of the ANC 
towards traditional authorities were not only ambiguous but also ambivalent. 
Secondly, the Inkatha Freedom Party’s bloody conflict with the United 
Democratic Front (UDF) as well as the ANC in the late 1980’s and early 
1990’s, also aided their recognition. Lastly, “the political and economic context 
within which the South African political settlement was taking place,” had to be 
taken into account.214 
 
5 2 3 2 Problems with section 21(2) and 22(2) of the Communal Land 
Rights Act 
 
Section 21(2) provides that 
 “if a community has a recognised traditional council, the powers and 
duties of the land administration committee of such community may 
be exercised and performed by such council.” 
Section 21(2) is significant since such a land administration committee is 
awarded wide powers in relation to the administration of land.215 The word 
“may” in the context of the Act, according to Claassens is potentially 
ambiguous. Should it be interpreted to mean that a community has a choice as 
to whether they want to be administered by a traditional council, as created in 
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terms of the Traditional and Leadership and Governance Framework Act?216 
Or should it be interpreted to mean the traditional leadership is authorised to 
exercise land administration powers in terms of the Communal Land Rights 
Act? 
In the light of section 22(2), the second interpretation appears to be the most 
likely, especially since no mechanism for the exercise of this effective choice is 
provided for in the Act. In this context section 22(2) might be of assistance: 
 
Section 22(2) provides: 
“[s]ubject to section 21(1), the members of a land administration 
committee must be persons not holding any traditional leadership 
position and must be elected by the community in the prescribed 
manner.” 
New composition requirements are set out in the Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Act.217 In cases where a traditional authority does not 
adhere to the new composition requirements, the community would be 
regarded not to have a traditional council. According to Claassens section 
22(2) implies that a community will only have a choice to elect a traditional 
council in the above-mentioned situation.218 On the one hand section 21(2) is 
the incentive to encourage traditional authorities to meet the composition 
requirements. Section 22(2) on the other hand, is the “disincentive” for failing to 
do so. 
 
As is evident from comparing the provisions of the Communal Land Rights Act 
relating to the Land Administration Committee with that in the 2003 Communal 
Land Rights Bill, there was a major shift in policy. Various academics have a 
similar explanation for this. The most probable one is the argument of 
                                                 
216
 Claassens “Power, Accountability and Apartheid Borders” in Land, Power and Custom 265-267. 
Claassens “The Communal Land Rigths Act and Women” Occasional Paper Series at 21. 
217
 41 of 2003. 
218
 Claassens “Power, Accountability and Apartheid Boundaries” in Land, Power and Custom at 266. 
71 
 
Cousins,219 Mostert and Pienaar220 who all are of the opinion that since the 
Communal Land Rights Act was rushed through Parliament just before the 
2004 democratic general elections, the ruling ANC221 government realized that 
in ensuring the support of traditional authorities and their fair amount of 
supporters they will have to do something to secure their support. The insertion 
of section 21(2) appears to be this leverage. Section 21(2) was inserted quite 
late in the process of drafting the final version of the 2003 Communal Land 
Rights Bill. As a result almost no consultation with rural communities on this 
important matter was conducted. 
 
5 2 4 Composition of a Land Administration Committee 
Section 22(1) provides that a Land Administration Committee must consist of a 
total number of members as was determined in the applicable community 
rules. Although the community can decide in the community rules the number 
of eligible persons they want on the Land Administration Committee, the 
Communal Land Rights Act should at least have provided for a maximum 
number of persons. In cases where a traditional council attains the functionality 
of the Land Administration Committee, they are under the obligation to ensure 
that one-third of the total number must be women.222 This provision was much 
contested by NGO’s and rural women.223 They felt that the one-third of women 
to serve on the land administration committee is not significant enough. This 
objection was based on research proving that more women than men reside in 
rural areas. The said research proved that 58,9% of people over the age of 18 
years, who live in these areas are women.224 
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Five individuals as designated by various spheres of national land 
administration must be represented on the Land Administration Committee. 
This includes one person to be appointed by the Minister of Land Affairs to 
represent the Department of Land Affairs.225 The chairperson of a Land Rights 
Board having jurisdiction in that particular area may also designate a person to 
serve on the Land Administration Committee.226 The relevant provincial 
Member of the Executive Council responsible for agriculture227 and local 
government matters may also nominate two people to serve on the Land 
Administration Committee.228 The designation of these two individuals by the 
respective MEC’s is a welcome insertion. It is hoped that these designated 
individuals will be senior members of the Executive Council so that they will be 
able to inform the Land Administration Committee of any relevant matters 
involving any agricultural ventures aimed at enhancing the livelihoods of the 
people the Land Administration Committee wishes to serve. Every municipality 
in whose area of jurisdiction such a Land Administration Committee is 
functioning must also designate a suitable individual to serve on the Land 
Administration Committee. As is the case with the designation of the two 
individuals by the respective MEC’s, it is also hoped that the individual 
designated by the relevant municipality will be a senior member in order for 
that person to inform and confirm the Land Administration Committee demands 
on service delivery and local governmental matters. Lastly one member of the 
Land Administration Committee must represent the interests of vulnerable 
community members such as women, children and the youth, the elderly and 
the disabled.229 This is yet another welcome provision, especially since child-
headed households are becoming a vast reality in communal areas due to the 
effect of HIV/AIDS. 
 
The composition of the Land Administration Committee achieves a greater 
degree of inter-departmental co-operation on local government level, as well as 
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on provincial level. This is positive in that greater interdepartmental co-
operation could lead to more effective service delivery. According to De 
Villiers,230 this problem has previously arisen in the restitution process where 
the Department of Land Affairs was directing the claiming procedures, while 
excluding other relevant national and provincial government departments such 
as the Department of Finance, Environmental Affairs, Trade and Industry and 
also Agriculture. Although greater recognition is given to interdepartmental 
relations in achieving the goals of the various land reform programmes, a 
coherent and integrated strategic framework is still needed to enhance 
effective interdepartmental co-operation. 
 
5 2 5 Powers and Duties of a Land Administration Committee 
When a Land Administration Committee has been duly established in terms of 
section 21, they acquire all the powers as provided for in section 24 of the Act, 
as well as the community rules. The fact that provision can be made in the 
community rules for the powers of the Land Administration Committee, means 
that some kind of restriction may be placed on the functioning of the Land 
Administration Committee. This provision could be of significant assistance, 
especially in cases where a traditional authority becomes the Land 
Administration Committee in a particular community. In the community rules 
the relevant community can decide to limit the participation of the Land 
Administration Committee in a certain matter or even to refuse the Land 
Administration Committee a say in matters of great importance. As such, the 
community can decide to award the final decision-making power on certain 
matters solely to the community as a whole, while the Land Administration 
Committee only acts in a consultative capacity. 
 
Section 24(2) provides that where a Land Administration Commitee takes a 
decision which effectively will result in the disposal of communal land or rights 
in land, such a decision will only be effective, upon the ratification of it by the 
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relevant Land Rights Board. Such ratification by the said Board must be in 
writing. This section is somewhat contradictory in that it provides that in the 
case of the disposal of land, the Land Administration Committee is responsible 
to the Land Rights Board but not to the community, on whose behalf they are 
acting. According to Smith, the drafters of the Act intended that disposals of 
land should be dealt with in the community rules. No authority is however 
provided in the Act for such a power in the said community rules.231 
 
Section 24(3)(a)(i) and (ii) places an additional obligation on a Land 
Administration Committee. It states that a Land Administration Committee must 
take measures to ensure the allocation of “new order rights,” subsequent to the 
Ministerial determination. It expressly lists particular categories of vulnerable 
persons who are prioritised as far as the allocation of “new order rights” are 
concerned, namely: women, the disabled and the youth. Section 24(3)(a)(ii) 
goes further and states that the Land Administration Committee must also take 
measures to ensure the registration of communal land as well as the 
registration of “new order rights.” 
 
In terms of section 24(3)(b) an administrative structure is also expected to take 
responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of registers, as well as 
the recording of all newly awarded “new order rights.” The responsibility in this 
context being placed on the Land Administration Committee, also relates to all 
transactions with regard to such rights. The promotion and safeguarding of a 
community’s and individual’s, interests in land by the Land Administration 
Commitee, is provided for in section 24(3)(c). As these rural communities have 
been gravely discriminated against in the past, social upliftment and 
empowerment is urgently needed here. The safeguarding of the interests of the 
community with regard to their land therefore deserves the priority it is 
receiving in the Act. 
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Further functions of administrative structures are that they must endeavour to 
promote co-operation amongst community members and all relevant 
stakeholders,232 they must play an active role in settlement of disputes 
concerning land,233 and they must compile and maintain records of existing 
land tenure rights.234 This latter duty also applies to any land tenure rights that 
will be conferred on an individual in future. Section 24 deals with the 
registration of new land allocations or land tenure rights to community 
members after the opening of the communal land register.235  
 
The Communal Land Rights Act created the new statutory land administration 
committee. As mentioned before, it is hoped that since land administration in 
many of the rural areas in total disarray,236 this innovation will change the 
situation for the better. The Land Administration Committee will be responsible 
for the daily dealings with the land, it is especially commendable that their 
functions with regard to the disposing of land or a right in land, is severely 
limited, compared with previous versions of the Communal Land Rights Bill.237 
Despite the limitations provided for in the Act, the Land Administration 
Committee will still have to be monitored in an effective way. If an individual 
member of the traditional authority, who is acting as the Land Administration 
Committee of a particular community, abuses his or her power, he or she 
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should be removed from the administration committee. They should be held 
liable in terms of sections 41 and 42 of the Communal Land Rights Act. These 
sections respectively deal with situations when a person is guilty of an offence 
and the possible penalties. 
Where a traditional authority acts as the Land Administration Committee, 
caution must be exercised in the composition of the said committee. This is 
because in the view of Smith, “the majority of the incumbents of a traditional 
council under the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act,” will 
not be elected but appointed in terms of customary law.238 The Communal 
Land Rights Act as a whole is in favour of gender equality. However the 
institution of traditional leadership has a bad track record when it comes to the 
promotion of women’s land rights and too large representation by traditional 
council members will undermine this purpose. 
 
5 3 “External” Administrative Organ: Land Rights Board 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the Land Rights Board is another statutory 
innovation created in the Communal Land Rights Act. A Land Rights Board is 
defined in section 1of the Act to mean “a board established in terms of Chapter 
8” of the Act. In the case of the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust Land, the 
already established Ingonyama Trust Board will be renamed to be known as the 
Land Rights Board for KwaZulu-Natal.239 
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5 3 1 Establishment of Land Rights Boards 
Section 25 provides that the Minister of Land Affairs may establish a Land 
Rights Board240 by the publication of a notice in the Government Gazette.241 
These boards will have jurisdiction only in the areas prescribed by the 
Minister.242 The Minister is also empowered to dissolve such boards and to 
amend their area of jurisdiction.243 
 
5 3 2 The Composition of a Land Rights Board 
According to section 26(1), the Minister of Land Affairs must appoint the board 
members. This must take place in accordance with the nomination and 
selection processes, provided for in the Regulations to the Act. This Land 
Rights Board must consist of a minimum of 11 members,244 who must be duly 
nominated. One official must be drawn from each of the government 
departments the Minister shall deem relevant for the purposes of participation in 
a Land Rights Board.245 This provision gives the Minister of Land Affairs the 
power to decide which government department will play a vital role in the 
allocation of land or land tenure rights. In this context, the fact that no definite 
upper limit is placed on the number of government officials who may be 
appointed by the Minister is ambiguous. While this may ensure better inter-
departmental co-operation, too many members may, on the other hand, hinder 
the effective functioning of a Land Rights Board. It is also doubtful if so many 
members will have the necessary knowledge to deal with communal land 
practices equitably. 
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Two more members may be nominated by the relevant Provincial House of 
Traditional Leaders.246 A further member must be nominated by institutions or 
persons in the commercial or industrial sector.247 A further seven members 
selected by the Minister from the affected communities will make up the rest of 
a board.248 This provision indicates that the Act is trying to create and promote 
community involvement. This is further substantiated by the fact that vulnerable 
people must be included in the seven members selected by the Minister. The 
Act, for instance provides that one member must represent the interests of 
child-headed households,249 while another must be representative of disabled 
persons.250 Yet another member of such a Land Rights Board must represent 
the youth.251 Section 26(2)(d)(iv) of the Communal Land Rights Act states that a 
member of a particular community must also represent the interest of female-
headed households. 
 
Section 26(3) of the Act is an important insertion, as it provides that the Minister 
must consider certain aspects in appointing the members of such a Land Rights 
Board. For instance, the Minister must have regard to the required knowledge 
of land, land tenure rights, old and new order rights and the required 
capabilities, including relevant skills, expertise and experience. These factors 
might eliminate certain people from acting as a board member, should the 
Minister find that he or she is not sensitive enough to the issue at hand, namely 
the over-arching goal of trying to secure tenure. 
 
The appointment of the chairperson of the Board, as well as the deputy 
chairperson of the Board, will only occur after the Minister has consulted with all 
of the members of the Board. The chairperson and deputy-chairperson of the 
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Board will be appointed from the ranks of the members of the Board.252 A 
further responsibility is placed on the Minister in that he or she is obliged to 
publish the names and the position held by each member, in the Government 
Gazette.253 This whole section seems to lend publicity to the board members, 
so that the community they try to help will know exactly who they are and what 
offices they hold. The date on which the appointment of these board members 
are to take effect, must also be published in the notice in the Government 
Gazette.254 
 
According to section 26(4) board members will be appointed for a period of five 
years.255 The Minister may in his or her discretion extend the term of a member, 
but only for a period not exceeding six months. During the period of extension a 
new board or a member must be appointed.256 The Communal Land Rights Act 
should have contained provisions that would result in consistency in the 
appointment and functioning of such boards. Since section 26(4) explicitly 
provides that board members may only be appointed for a period of five years, 
which may be extended to another six months, this will result in new boards 
having to be established every five years. Surely this will impact negatively on 
the land administration in that particular area of jurisdiction. New Land Rights 
Boards will have to familiarise themselves from scratch with the unique 
circumstances relating to tenure arrangements in a particular area. Instead the 
Act could have provided for some sort of continuity in stating that the minimum 
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term of at least one quarter of the members of the board will be for a period of 
seven years or longer. 
 
When a board member dies or vacates his or her office before the expiry date 
of his or her appointment, the Minister may appoint someone to fill the vacancy 
for the rest of the unexpired period.257 
 
The following persons are not qualified to serve on a Land Rights Board: 
(i) A person who is not a South African citizen and who does not have 
permanent residency in the country or who is not ordinarily a resident in South 
Africa;258 
(ii) An unrehabilitated insolvent;259 
(iii) A person who has been declared mentally incompetent by a court of law 
or who is in detainment, under the 1973 Mental Health Act;260 
(iv) A person who has been removed from an office of trust on an account of 
improper conduct;261 
(v) Any person whose name has been removed from a professional register 
on account of misconduct and has not been reinstated;262 
(vi) A person who was found guilty of contravening section 7,263 of the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act;264 
(vii) Any person who is an elected political representative at the national, 
provincial or municipal sphere of government.265 
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The disqualified persons mentioned here are persons who are regarded in the 
South African law to either have limited legal capacity, because they are unable 
to understand the nature and content of their legal acts and cannot be held 
liable for it. Some of the grounds for disqualification relates to the unethical 
behaviour of board members. 
 
A board member will have to vacate his or her office if he/she becomes 
disqualified in terms of section 27(1).266 If he or she resigns in a written notice to 
the Minister, he or she must also vacate office.267 A board member must also 
vacate his/her office if the Minister in his or her opinion and after consultation 
with the Board thinks that a member is incapable of properly performing his or 
her function and orders him or her to vacate the office.268 Lastly a member of a 
Board will have to vacate his or her office, if he or she is absent from two or 
more meetings of the Board, without permission from the Board. According to 
section 27(2)(d) such a member must be absent for a continuous period of 
twelve months. 269 This also relates to the continuity argument offered earlier. 
An absent board member will not be suitable or informed enough to serve the 
best interests of rural inhabitants. The disqualification of a board member as 
provided for in section 27(2)(d) therefore seems appropriate. 
 
5 3 3 Powers and Duties of a Land Rights Board 
According to section 28(1)(a) a Land Rights Board is responsible for providing 
general advice to the Minister and specific or general advice to particular 
communities. The general or specific advice provided to a community must be 
with regard to sustainable land ownership and use. Developmental initiatives 
pertaining to land as well as the providing of access to land on a more equitable 
basis, is listed as additional further matters that the Board must provide advice 
on. 
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Greater liaison initiatives must be proposed by the Board with the national, 
provincial and municipal spheres of government.270 Liaison with civil and any 
other institution is also proposed in the Act, especially on matters affecting 
communities or communal land.271 Section 28(1)(c) states that a Land Rights 
Board must ensure compliance with the Constitution and the Act as a whole. 
This section is important as it places an even greater responsibility on the Land 
Rights Board to effect secure tenure. If a Land Rights Board or an individual 
member does not adhere to this provision, they will be guilty of an offence and 
will be penalised in terms of the Act. This may even result in the disqualification 
of a Board or its individual members. 
 
Section 28(2) of the Communal Land Rights Act explicitly provides for additional 
powers of Land Rights Boards. It states that a Land Rights Board and any 
member of a board, acting in their official capacity, may at any reasonable time 
enter upon any land,272 they may investigate any matter relating to land273 and 
they may also inspect any document that is in the possession of an 
administrative structure or any right holder and they may make copies of such a 
document.274 This situation is very similar to the position in terms of section 
44(1)(a) of the Sectional Titles Act where this power is given to the Body 
Corporate to enter upon the unit of a sectional title owner. According to Van der 
Merwe,275 a sectional owner “shall allow reasonable access to his section for 
the purpose of inspecting and maintaining common electrical and plumbing 
installations and ensuring that the provisions of this Act and the rules are being 
observed. He must thus on written notice (except in case of an emergency), 
permit a person to enter his section in order to inspect, maintain, repair or 
renew communal pipes, wires, cable and ducts inside the section.” However, 
where in the Sectional Titles Act adequate reasons are provided for the 
curtailment on sectional ownership, this does not happen in the Communal 
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Land Rights Act. It seems therefore that entering upon land in the latter 
instance could be unjustifiable and could even amount to trespassing. On the 
other hand, these provisions could have been inserted to be of aid in the 
effective administration of land management. Land Rights Boards are appointed 
in an advisory capacity and therefore will have to inform themselves of all 
related and relevant matters pertaining to communal land. 
Meetings may be convened by the Board or any member of it, in his or her 
official capacity.276 They also have the power to attend meetings of the 
communities and the administrative structures.277  
 
5 4 Assessment 
From the above, it appears that the Administrative Structures could easily carry 
out the functions and powers of Land Rights Boards. In practice this could be 
potentially problematic, especially in areas where a recognised traditional 
authority will be acting as a Land Administration Committee. Since this 
duplication of structures, is both costly and causes unnecessary delays, it is 
unclear how it could promote access to land. Nevertheless, the rationale for the 
creation of these two statutory institutions can hopefully provide some 
justification. The Land Administration Committee is responsible for the daily 
management of the communal land whereas the Land Rights Board is 
responsible for advising the Minister and communities. Since the Land 
Administration Committee is uniquely positioned in their relationship with a 
particular community, they could also provide valuable advice to the Minister 
regarding the sustainable use of communal land. This argument is equally valid 
in relation to all the functions awarded to the Land Rights Board. Land Rights 
Boards are not under a legislative obligation to provide effective assistance to 
the communities where they have jurisdiction. This is despite the fact that 
influential people are serving on it, namely the various members of the relevant 
state departments. 
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In terms of the Communal Land Rights Act the Minister of Land Affairs will now 
be advised by two different structures, namely the land rights enquirer as well 
as the Land Rights Board. The advice of both these structures in reality relates 
to identical or at least, very similar issues. 
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CHAPTER 6:   PROCEDURES OF THE COMMUNAL LAND 
RIGHTS ACT IN SECURING TENURE 
 
6 1 Introduction 
According to the provisions of the Communal Land Rights Act a land rights 
enquiry is a prerequisite for securing and transferring old order rights. Section 
14 provides as follows: “Prior to securing an old order right in terms of section 4 
or transferring communal land to a community or person in terms of section 6 
or determining comparable redress in terms of section 12, the Minister must 
institute a land rights enquiry.” This part of the study will investigate and 
comment on the nature of the land rights enquiry and the vital determination 
phase before discussing and analysing the registration procedures and 
comparable redress. 
 
6 2 The Land Rights Enquiry 
From the wording of section 14 it seems as if the land rights enquiry is a 
prerequisite to a variety of actions by the Minister. It appears from the wording 
of section 14(1) that the Minister is under an obligation to institute the land 
rights enquiry, as the word “must” is used to emphasise this. This is one of 
many obligations the Act places on the Minister. It remains to be seen to what 
extent the Minister will be able to fulfil these obligations and also to what extent 
will they be delegated. 
According to section 17(1) the land rights enquiry must be conducted in the 
prescribed manner. Fundamental constitutional principles must be heeded. In 
particular the enquiry must be open and transparent. The affected communities 
must also receive an opportunity to participate in the enquiry by making their 
views known and offering objections. This provision is in line with the idea of 
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participatory democracy, as envisaged in the White Paper on South African 
Land Policy.278 
Section 17(2) provides that the enquirer must adopt measures to ensure well-
informed and democratic decisions. The decisions taken should also be a valid 
reflection of the wishes of the majority of the adult community members, 
present at community meetings.279 The reference to “adult community 
members” might be problematic in this context, especially since child-headed 
households in the areas covered by the Communal Land Rights Act are a 
reality. The interest of these vulnerable minors should have been included 
here. Its omission is of great concern and its impact could be far-reaching, 
something that should have been realised by the legislature and the various 
stakeholders.280 
 
When a matter is referred to the enquirer for further investigation, he or she is 
obliged to lodge a report to the Minister. Valid recommendations must be made 
by him or her and includes matters that ultimately will be decided on by the 
Minister.281 The said report must be made available to the affected community 
before being submitted to the Minister.282 At the same time the community 
should also be given the opportunity to scrutinise the report and to make 
representations relating to matters contained in the report.283 The final report, 
including the representations and supporting documents must be handed to the 
Minister for further consideration and his or her determination will be based on 
this, in upgrading old order rights into new order rights, or awarding new 
land.284 
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Section 17(4)(a), (b) and (c) respectively provide for the compiling of written 
and verbal evidence; the entering and searching of premises and the taking of 
possession of documents and articles and lastly, for convening and attending 
meetings by affected parties. In the exercise of any of the above-mentioned 
functions, it is explicitly stated that the land rights enquirer or his or her 
delegate, must have regard to the constitutional rights of the affected persons. 
This insertion aims to ensure that the dignity of the rural occupiers is not 
adversely affected by the very officers who should be of assistance to them, in 
securing their tenure. 
 
6 2 2 Matters to be Enquired 
Matters that must be investigated by the land rights enquirer is set out in 
section 14(2) of the Communal Land Rights Act. It provides that the land rights 
enquirer must investigate the nature and extent of all the constitutional and 
human285 and other aspects related to land rights.286 These include 
investigation into old order rights; competing and also conflicting land tenure 
rights.287 However before the enquiry can officially be conducted, section 16(a) 
obliges the Minister to publish a notice of the intended enquiry in national, 
regional and local media. The notice must at the same time also extend an 
invitation to all interested parties to participate actively in the intended 
inquiry.288 In the light of the complexity of tenure and related issues, active and 
progressive participation of the affected communities are vital especially those 
in urgent need of tenure security. 
 
The interest of the State,289 options available for securing insecure land 
rights,290 and provisions regarding the accessibility of land on an equitable 
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basis are matters requiring further enquiry.291 Provision is also made for 
enquiring into spatial planning, land use management and land development 
matters.292 A development or a de-densification or any land reform programme 
must be additionally considered.293 The inquiry into any relevant land reform 
programme makes sense. This is because of the possibility of a restitution 
claim being instituted for a specific portion of land, where another community is 
in current occupation. Their title may be insecure, and they might at the same 
time wish to establish a clear title to that land.294 
 
The enquiry into spatial planning and land use management seems to acquire 
the co-operation of local government structures, as well as the traditional 
leadership structures functioning in a specific area.295 It is De Villiers’296 
contention that the South African government has not “embarked on a 
sufficient education information campaign” explaining the complexities of the 
three main land reform programmes and their sub-programmes. This leads to 
rural communities having different views and expectations of the programmes 
applicable to “their” land.297 De Villiers further advocates that the role of the 
different government institutions in land reform and post-transfer management 
and support need to be defined more clearly and extensively.298  
 
According to De Villiers the Department of Land Affairs directed the process of 
land reform in a centralized manner and other national and provincial 
government departments were thus virtually excluded. For example, the 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Affairs should have been 
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involved throughout the process of tenure reform. Lately the Department of 
Land Affairs is beginning to show greater awareness of involving and 
consulting other provincial and national government departments. This point is 
evident in sections 18(1)(b) and 18(4)(a) of the Communal Land Rights Act. 
The recently promulgated Intergovernmental Relations Bill is another example 
of this realisation of the government. The Department of Land Affairs also 
involves land authorities to a greater extent than usual, especially in the pre-
acquisition process. Despite this greater involvement of provincial and national 
government departments, a sufficient integrated and coherent strategy, which 
specifically sets out the role and functions of the respective government 
departments, is still lacking. 
 
Section 14(2)(f) of the Communal Land Rights Act also requires the enquirer to 
investigate into matters regarding comparable redress. The nature and extent 
of such comparable redress need further investigation. Comparable redress is 
especially important where conflicting land tenure rights exist on the same 
portion of land, and it is impossible to solve the matter while at the same time 
considering the needs of all the affected parties.299 It appears that the land 
rights enquirer will have to address the matter of comparable redress in his or 
her report to the Minister, who will have to act further on this matter. The issue 
regarding comparable redress in cases of conflicting land rights needed to be 
provided for in more detail in the current Communal Land Rights Act since this 
is a reality in communal areas. It is common knowledge that when the forced 
removals occurred in previous years, people were placed on land already 
occupied and farmed by families, who have been there for centuries. This led 
to massive discontent and even violence in these areas.300 
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Another matter the land rights enquirer must investigate further, is measures 
ensuring compliance with section 4 and the promotion of gender equality in the 
allocation, registration and exercise of new order rights.301 The 2003 
Communal Land Rights Bill placed more emphasis on the achievement of 
gender equality than the current Communal Land Rights Act.302 It is now the 
responsibility of the enquirer to ensure that women in rural areas participate in 
the land rights investigation. The 2002 Communal Land Rights Bill obliged the 
participation of women in both the land administration structure, as well as in 
the Land Rights Board.303 Compared to these provisions, the current 
Communal Land Rights Act limits the participation of women in land rights 
issues extensively and this could be an indication of the legislature to uphold 
the notion of male predominance in decision making. This is despite various 
studies showing that female-headed households also represent a large group 
of people in urgent need of secure tenure.304 
 
Section 14(2)(h) and (i) address matters that might be of relevance to the 
Minister and that are not expressly provided for in the Act. According to Mostert 
and Pienaar, section 14(2)(i) is an “umbrella provision.”305 This section states 
that the enquirer must also investigate “any other matter as prescribed or as 
instructed by the Minister.”306 Section 14(2)(i) coupled with section 17(5) of the 
Communal Land Rights Act, that determines that the Minister may award the 
enquirer even more power and duties for the effective conduct of the enquiry, 
renders the functions of the enquirer even more extensive. Mostert and 
Pienaar are of the opinion that section 14(2)(i) of the Act is necessary for 
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“embodiment of a multi-disciplinary or all-encompassing approach towards the 
enquiry.” In the light of the movement towards a more inter-departmental 
approach in government relations this makes sense. Mostert and Pienaar voice 
the concern that it is strange that no express provision is made for enquiring 
into agricultural matters, as this is the livelihood of the majority of the rural 
inhabitants.307 However since both section 14(2)(h) and (i) are formulated to 
include this, the omission seems to be addressed. The matters that may be 
enquired into are quite broad and it places a huge task on the enquirer, 
especially since he or she is obliged by law to conduct the enquiry into the 
stated matters. However no provision is made for sanctions should he or she 
fail to enquire into some of these matters. 
 
6 2 3 Completion of the Enquiry 
According to section 17(3)(a), once the enquirer has completed the enquiry 
and after he or she took into account all the factors mentioned  in section 14(2), 
he or she is required to make recommendations for the Minister to consider. 
The enquiry report must also be made available for inspection by interested or 
affected communities.308 At the same time affected or interested communities 
must be given the opportunity to make representations in relation to any matter 
with which they are not satisfied in the report. Only once this has been done 
may the enquirer submit the report, as well as the representations together with 
his or her recommendations with the Minister. In the previous versions of the 
Act, nothing to this effect was provided for. Section 17(3)(c) attempts to 
achieve a greater degree of community involvement309 Which is a welcome 
insertion. It seems that the legislature realized that since vulnerable and 
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marginalized citizens are involved, their viewpoints need to be heard in all 
instances. Participatory democracy is definitely of importance in the enquiry 
phases, and acknowledgement of it in the Act suggests the realities on the 
ground will be taken into account to better the livelihoods of thousands of rural 
dwellers. These realities relate to the fact that despite that Permits to Occupy 
being traditionally only awarded to men, it is mostly women who are 
responsible for the cultivation of the land. 
 
The Communal Land Rights Act does not make any provision for an appeal 
procedure, against the report of the enquirer.310 Despite the fact that the 
communities have the opportunity to make representations on the report before 
its submission to the Minister, the final drafting of the report is still in the hands 
of the enquirer, who is under no obligation to take the representations into 
account. Affected and unsatisfied communities will therefore have to be very 
involved and active in their representations, and during the whole enquiry 
phase. This will hopefully ensure that their concerns are voiced and heard at all 
crucial times, and that their objections are backed by substantial evidence. 
Compulsory community participation also appears to be an indirect objective of 
section 17(3)(b) of the Communal Land Rights Act. 
 
Another matter that sorely lacks in the functioning of the enquiry is that no time-
frames have been provided in the Communal Land Rights Act within which the 
enquiry should be conducted and ultimately completed.311 The omission of 
realistic time-frames in itself could make tenure security a distant dream. At the 
same time it could also negatively affect the effectiveness of the Communal 
Land Rights Act and the fulfilment of its aims.312 The Communal Land Rights 
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Act provides for only one enquiry and one report having to be lodged with the 
Minister, as opposed to the previous versions of the Act, which also provided 
for a preliminary enquiry phase and effective time-frames. The Communal 
Land Rights Act does not provide for any time-frames within which valid 
objections against the enquiry report must be lodged. This in itself could be 
time-consuming in the quest to secure tenure. 
 
According to Smith the obligations of the enquirers are not extensive enough.313 
The critical identification and determination of social boundaries of communities 
are not listed as a task of the enquirer. He or she is only responsible for 
recommending the location and extent of the land to be transferred. There is no 
obligation on the enquirer to determine which persons belong to a certain 
community. 
 
6 3 The Determination Phase 
Once the land rights enquirer has lodged his or her report with the Minister, the 
Minister must exercise his or her ministerial discretion in terms of the cardinal 
section 10 of the Communal Land Rights Act. Section 18 provides for the 
possible actions that the Minister may take after considering the land rights 
report. Section 18 is considered by various academics314 as “pivotal” and as 
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being the “main thrust” of the Act, as it attempts to identify the best possible 
solution for every holder of an old order right. Section 18(1) states that if the 
Minister is content that all the legislative requirements for the report have been 
met, he or she may start to make certain determinations.315 However, regard 
must be given to other particular issues as well, which include the final report of 
the enquirer,316 and other relevant laws.317 These other laws include customary 
law and especially laws governing spatial planning, local government and 
agriculture.318 Section 18(1)(c), (d) and (e) respectively provides that the 
Minister must also take into consideration the old order rights of all affected 
right holders, the need to provide access to land on an equitable basis and the 
promotion of gender equality in all matters pertaining to the urgent need for 
land. The Minister is also under the obligation to determine the location and 
extent of the land to be transferred to a community or an individual, where 
applicable. 
 
No provision is made as to what must be done if boundary conflicts arise 
already during the determination phase. It seems that the Communal Land 
Rights Act assumes that all boundary disputes or conflicting land tenure rights 
will by this time already have been solved successfully by the enquirer. The 
only thing here left for the Minister is to determine the amount of comparable 
redress, based on which community or individual has the strongest claim to the 
land. Mostert and Pienaar note that there are no provisions relating to this issue 
in the Communal Land Rights Act compelling the Minister to consult or to gain 
the co-operation of the affected communities or individuals.319 Moreover, no 
opportunity is given to the affected communities or individuals to make further 
representations to the Minister based on their right to land or comparable 
redress. Representations are only made to the Enquirer. Still, the ultimate 
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decision will be that of the Minister, who will have to rely solely on the final 
report of the Enquirer. 
 
Section 18(3) of the Communal Land Rights Act gives an exposition of the 
options available to the Minister, when having to decide the fate of old order 
right holders. Section 18(3)(a) provides that the Minister may determine that 
the whole of an area must be surveyed and registered or remain registered in 
the name of a specific community. This section is particularly elusive, 
according to Mostert and Pienaar, since it does not clearly state why a 
registered right must be redesignated.320 In attempting to shed some light on 
this matter, they are of the opinion that the only “plausible solution” appears to 
be relating to the registration in the name of a particular community, and the 
subsequent endorsement of the title deed. This may be done to replace 
predecessors in title effectively, namely individuals, traditional leaders, 
communal property associations, trusts or other legal entities. However this 
section is still problematic in that it does not state whether lawfully registered 
land in the name of a community will have to be reregistered. If the answer to 
this is in the affirmative, this will not only be time-consuming, it will also be a 
waste of much needed resources which could have been applied somewhere 
else more productively, for instance in comparable redress issues. It is also 
unclear whether the already registered title deed will only have to be endorsed. 
Despite what will have to be done to the already registered land, section 18 still 
applies. As such this could lead to lawfully registered owners of land becoming 
mere “new order right holders,” which is a totally unacceptable outcome. 
 
Section 18(3)(b) provides that the Minister may determine that the whole of an 
area be subdivided into portions of land. Each of these portions must then be 
registered in the name of a person and not a community. Section 18(3)(c) 
however provides that part of an area must be registered or remain registered 
in the name of a specific community and that only part of the land must be 
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subdivided and registered in the name of individuals.321 The Minister may also 
decide that a part of the land must be reserved to the State. The land referred 
to here must obviously be land rich in valuable resources. This provision 
therefore aims to ensure the sustainable development, to serve the whole of 
South Africa. 
 
Section 18(2)(a)-(d) of the Act deals with the subdivision of communal land, 
and it does so without taking into account the restrictions imposed on the sub-
division of land as prescribed by the Prohibition on the Subdivision of 
Agricultural Land Act.322 Mostert and Pienaar anticipate that this could be 
because of the repealing of the Prohibition Act having been proposed for some 
time now. While the Prohibition Act is still in force, it would be possible for the 
Minister to make the determination in terms of section 18 of the Communal 
Land Rights Act, subject to an exemption from the Prohibition Act by the 
Minister. Yet, according to Mostert and Pienaar, this interpretation would 
“require a construction about simultaneous application of the Communal Land 
Rights Act and the Prohibition Act which cannot readily be inferred for either 
these acts as they currently stand.”323 
 
Section 18(3)(d) states what the Minister could do to secure the “old order 
rights” of vulnerable communities and individuals. This section is of vital 
importance to most people in the rural areas, as they are the holders of these 
insecure rights. Mostert and Pienaar are of the opinion that section 18(3)(d) 
deals with “the destiny of ‘old order rights.’” According to section 18(3)(d)(i) of 
the Act the Minister may determine whether an “old order right” will be 
confirmed or not. This apparently clear section seems not to be so clear after 
all. Further inspection gives rise to the following unanswered question namely, 
whether the confirmation of ‘old order rights’ means that their status remains 
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the same, or whether they in fact obtain greater recognition and protection in 
that they will now automatically be converted into stronger ‘new order 
rights’”?324 If the latter is the answer to this problematic question, the 
subsequent question will then relate to the function of section 18(3)(d)(i) since 
it will inevitably now have the same consequence as section 18(3)(d)(ii). 
Section 18(3)(d)(i) also provides no indication as to exactly what kind of rights 
the Minister might decide to confirm or not.325 
 
A further question relates to what confirmation entails. Does it entail the 
surveying and registration or re-registration of certain portions of land, in order 
for the section to be in line with section 18(3)(a)? Or does confirmation mean 
the inevitable formalization of insecure “old order rights” into registered 
surveyed “new order rights?” And does confirmation imply that even land rights 
obtained in terms of the Communal Property Association Act must also go 
through the determination and re-registration processes of the Act? Should the 
status of the rights to be confirmed, remain the same, secure tenure will still not 
be realised. It seems once again that the effect of section 18(3)(d)(i) was not 
anticipated thoroughly. Nevertheless, the uncertainty around the effect of the 
confirmation of “old order rights” needs to be addressed urgently, as this one 
section may undermine the whole aim of the Communal Land Rights Act. 
 
Section 18(3)(d)(ii) states that the Minister may decide to convert “old order 
rights” into full ownership or a similar “new order right.” The Minister must also 
determine the nature and extent of the similar right.326 Although the terms of 
section 18(3)(d)(ii) are clearer than section 18(3)(d)(i), it still appears to have 
an undesirable consequence. Section 18(3)(d)(ii) creates the impression that 
although ownership is an option which can be awarded to holders of “old order 
rights” following the conversion of the rights, it is still not an entitlement of all 
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holders of “old order rights.” This is evident from the last part of section 
18(3)(d)(ii) which provides that ownership will not necessary follow upon 
conversion but that the Minister might award “a comparable new order right.” 
This part of section 18(3)(d)(ii) seems to be in favour of the idea of the 
diversification of land rights.327 With regard to the confirmation and conversion 
of “old order rights,” the Communal Land Rights Act again lacks the necessary 
time frames within which “old order rights” must be confirmed or converted.328 
The reason for this ill-considered provision appears to relate to the haste with 
which the Act was rushed through Parliament and its subsequent 
promulgation.329 In this instance the Communal Land Rights Act differs from 
the recently enacted Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act,330 
where adequate provision was made for the conversion of old order mineral 
rights to new order rights.331 
 
Section 18(3)(d)(iii) of the Act deals with the cancellation of “old order rights,” 
which must be done in accordance with Chapter 4 of the Act. Chapter 4 deals 
with comparable redress where tenure cannot be made legally secure. If an 
“old order right” is cancelled in terms of section 18(3)(d)(iii) the land to which 
this right relates, must be incorporated into land held or to be held by a 
community. The holder of such an “old order right” will have to receive 
comparable redress, by taking into account sections 12 and 13 of the 
Communal Land Rights Act. The procedure for the award for comparable 
redress as set out in section 12 differs from that to be followed by section 
18(3)(d)(iii). The section 12 procedure will find application in cases where an 
“old order” land rights holder has applied to the Minister for comparable 
redress, whereas in section 18(3)(d)(iii) there is no such application procedure. 
The two sections cross-reference to one another. This is evident from the fact 
                                                 
327
 A discussion on the preferred approach adopted in the Communal Land Rights Act namely an 
ownership paradigm or a diversification/fragmentation paradigm will follow at 2.3.3. 
328
 Mostert & Pienaar “Formalisation of South African Communal Land Title” in Modern Studies III 
at 331. 
329
 Mostert & Pienaar “Formalisation of South African Communal Land Title” in Modern Studies III 
at 31. 
330
 28 of 2002. 
331
 Schedule II of the MPRDA. 
99 
 
that section 12(3) provides that the section 18 procedure will have to be 
followed, with the retention of the necessary changes. What was apparently not 
anticipated was the confusion these two sections have as a result. Section 12 
deals with an application lodged by the holder of an older right which cannot be 
made legally secure, whereas section 18 deals with the securing of old order 
rights, at the initiative of the Minister, after considering the report of the land 
rights enquirer. Although these two processes are different, the determination 
phase in terms of section 18 is still relevant in both instances.  
 
The different varieties of redress are set out in section 12(2) of the Act. Section 
12(2)(a) provides that comparable redress could be alternative land or 
monetary compensation or any other form.332 What “any other form” means is 
not clear. Lastly, comparable redress can comprise of a combination of 
alternative land, a right in land or compensation. The Communal Land Rights 
Act does not indicate when an “old order right” holder will have to apply for an 
award for comparable redress. Will it be in the course of the enquiry where it is 
certain that someone or a community has a stronger right to a portion of land 
than one of the other occupiers? Within what time will the Minister have to 
consider this application and get back to the applicant on it?  
 
Since stronger claimants may indeed be in occupation of the land, and people 
were later “dumped” there because of forced racially based removals, the land 
rights of the aforementioned group may be rendered even less secure. This is 
a crucial matter that should have been addressed in the enquiry phase. 
Suitable recommendations regarding this should have been included in the 
report that was compiled and submitted to the Minister. Since conflicting land 
rights are a reality in communal areas, the unpacking of these rights, and the 
subsequent award of comparable redress mean that the budget for tenure 
reform will have to be increased substantially. Whether the Department of Land 
Affairs will be able to deliver on this, is questionable, especially if one takes into 
                                                 
332
 S 12(2)(b) of the Communal Land Rights Act. 
100 
 
account that it is estimated that almost 13 million people reside in these 
communal areas.333 An application for comparable redress can only be lodged 
after all disputes relating to a certain portion of land have been solved 
adequately and all the interested parties are satisfied with the outcome. This is 
where section 18(5) also becomes relevant. Section 18(5) provides that a 
Minister is not allowed to make any determination before any dispute relating to 
land or a right in land has not been solved by mediation or by traditional or non-
traditional means.334 If necessary a dispute relating to land or a right to land 
can also be solved by taking the matter to a suitable court.335 In this scenario 
the Minister is responsible to ensure that the dispute is resolved. However, no 
time frames are provided within which the dispute has to be resolved. This 
omission could once again compromise tenure security, since dispute 
resolution could become a lengthy process. 
 
Section 13 deals with an additional matter before an old order right in land will 
be regarded as being cancelled. It provides that the Minister will have to obtain 
the written agreement of the holder of an “old order right” and take into account 
the conditions they agreed on, before cancelling the right. 
Mostert and Pienaar offer valuable criticism against the cancellation of “old 
order rights,” as set out in section 12 of the Act. They are of the opinion that it 
is uncertain and unclear whether a separate procedure is a requisite in terms of 
section 12 or if the procedure under section 18 should be followed.336 Section 
12 does not provide any time frame to the interested parties as to when an 
application for the cancellation of an “old order right” should be lodged, 
whereas the determination phase in terms of section 18 is being preceded by 
the land rights enquiry.337 The Act further omits giving factors which determine 
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when rendition of security will be regarded as impossible, how comparable 
redress must be determined if redress consists in the payment of money, when 
it will be paid and to whom it will be payable, namely to the nested community 
or to individuals.338 
 
Section 18(4)339 of the Communal Land Rights Act provides that when the 
Minister makes a determination in terms of the said section, he or she must 
take into account the Integrated Development Plan of each municipality where 
there is communal land and where the Communal Land Rights Act will 
subsequently be applicable.340 The Minister is also obliged to consult with the 
Minister of Local Government, municipalities and other important land-use 
regulators acting in a specific geographical area.341 The consultation with the 
abovementioned institutions and individuals is of utmost importance since in 
many cases they are more aware of the realities on the ground than the 
officials of the Department of Land Affairs or the Minister him or herself. Local 
municipalities, who have to render much needed services such as water 
supply, electricity and sanitation, should also be aware of the estimated land 
needed to render these basic services or how much land is needed to erect 
other amenities such as schools or clinics. 
 
Following the said consultations the Minister may decide to reserve a right to 
the State or a municipality.342 At the same time the Minister may reserve any 
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additional land-use or condition to the State or a relevant municipality.343 When 
taking into account that service delivery in these areas is not up to standard, 
these provisions are indeed necessary. This is evident in section 18(4)(a)(i) 
which so eloquently provides that where the Minister has determined to reserve 
land on behalf of the State or a municipality, it must be done for a public 
purpose or in the interest of the public or community. 
 
Another reason provided by the Communal Land Rights Act why rights in land 
need to be reserved by the State, is to provide protection for “the affected land, 
rights in such land, an owner of such land and a holder of such rights.”344 
Exactly what the rationale is behind this is, is unclear. 
 
Section 18(4)(b)(i) of the Communal Land Right Act contains a much awaited 
provision. It provides that the Minister may confer a “new order right” on a 
woman who is a spouse of a male holder of an “old order right.” The married 
couple will be regarded as holding the “new order right” jointly. This provision 
was much debated and contested.345 A widow of a deceased male holder of an 
“old order right” or to whom a “new order right” succeeds will also be able to 
hold that right solely as the successor of it.346 The Minister also has the power 
in terms of section 18(4)(b)(iii) of the Act to confer a “new order right” on 
women. Section 18(4)(b) as a whole is a victory for women in the rural areas, 
since the amelioration of their plight was already highlighted in the initiating 
phases of this legislation. Especially section 18(4)(b)(ii) is now in line with the 
provisions as contained in the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act.347 
Before the promulgation of the Recognition Act women were unable to inherit 
land intestately from their husbands, despite the fact that the majority of the 
black population are women.348 Various communities and NGO’s in their 
                                                 
343
 S 18(4)(a) of the Communal Land Rights Act. 
344
 S 18(4)(a)(ii) of the Communal Land Rights Act. 
345
 Thwala “Land and Agrarian Reform in South Africa” at 8-9; Claassens “Community Views” at 7. 
346
 S 18(4)(b)(ii) of the Communal Land Rights Act. 
347
 120 of 1998. Hereafter referred to as the Recognition Act. 
348
 Janse van Rensburg “ The True Capacity of Women Under Customary Rule to Acquire Land: An 
expose on the Law, Land and the Rules of Succession” 2003 (2) Stell LR 282 at 283. See also Thwala 
103 
 
submissions called for the status of women in acquiring land and rights in land 
to be expressed in clearer terms.349 It appears that section 18(4)(b) is also in 
line with policy relating to women and land, as envisaged in the 1997 White 
Paper.350 
 
Section 4 of the Communal Land Rights Act underscores the importance of the 
land rights of women. Section 4(a) provides that a community or person is 
entitled either to tenure security or to comparable redress. Women are no 
doubt included in this section and this is even more evident from the wording of 
section 4(b) and (c). The construction and the wording of section 4(b) is very 
similar to section 18(4)(b)(i) and accordingly so is the impact. Section 4(b) 
however goes further than section 18(4)(b)(i). It provides that an “old order 
right” held by a married person is, despite any law, practice, usage or 
registration to the contrary, deemed to be held by all spouses in a marriage in 
which such person is a spouse, jointly in undivided shares irrespective of the 
matrimonial property regime applicable to such marriage and must, on 
confirmation or conversion in terms of section 18(3), be registered in the 
names of all such spouses.” Since customary marriages are potentially 
polygamous in nature, this section secures the tenure right of all spouses in 
such a marriage. 
 
Section 18(4)(c) also provides for the validation of putative “old order rights,” 
which were acquired in good faith. If it is clear that such a right was indeed 
acquired in bad faith, it will have to be invalidated. This decision on validation 
or invalidation is once again that of the Minister who will have to determine the 
lawful holders of that right.351 The validation of a putative “old order right” will 
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have the effect of the right being converted into a “new order right”, although 
this is merely implied by the wording of section 18(4)(c) of the Act.352 It is 
unclear exactly what putative rights entail, as there is no definition in the Act to 
shed some light on this term. It is, however, possible that by validating putative 
“old order rights,” the Act aims to address particular informal rights.353 These 
informal rights might have been granted de facto and in the absence of any 
explainable legal basis. As such, it is also possible that these rights receive 
protection in the earlier mentioned Interim Protection of Informal Land Rights 
Act.354 
 
Lastly, section 18(5) provides that the Minister may not make any 
determination to land or a right in land, if that land is affected by a dispute. The 
dispute first needs to be resolved either by mediation or any traditional or non-
traditional alternative dispute resolution. 
 
6 4 Assessment 
 
It is Mostert and Pienaars’s contention that although section 18 is of utmost 
importance for the operation of the Act, it is still rather lengthy, vague and 
ambiguous. The Act also gives no indication as to exactly what “new order 
rights” entail. Although a “new order right” may sometimes be ownership, this 
appears not always to be the case. This is evident since the provision dealing 
with the conversion of “new order rights” into freehold would then have an 
illogical impact. Upon closer analysis, this insertion also seems to be in line 
with the White Paper’s idea of fragmented use-rights and the protection thereof 
through registration. This is also evident from section 9(1) of the Act which 
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provides that the “holder of a registered new order right may apply to the 
community owning the land to which such right relates for the conversion of 
such right into freehold.” It is therefore obvious that a difference indeed exists 
between “new order rights” on the one hand and freehold on the other hand. It 
can be inferred that the conversion of “old order rights” into “new order rights” 
is are in fact very similar, the distinction lies in the fact that the latter will be 
formalised and registered rights, therefore rendering it as secure. The afore-
mentioned result therefore in an insecure and therefore unprotected right in 
land. 
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CHAPTER 7:   SECURITY OF TITLE, THE REGISTRATION 
PROCEDURE AND THE FRAGMENTATION OF LAND RIGHTS 
 
7 1 Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter 1 of this study, one of the aims of the Communal 
Land Rights Act is to address tenure insecurity in rural areas. This aim is also 
well articulated in section 4 of the Communal Land Rights Act. The Communal 
Land Rights Act attempts to achieve this security of tenure through the 
registration of “new order rights,” in the name of communities and individuals. 
The discussion in this part of the study will therefore comprise of a comparison 
between existing registration procedures and those adopted in the Act. 
Reference in this context will also be made to how policy choices have 
influenced the registration procedures in the Communal Land Rights Act and 
also the effectiveness of the adapted registration procedures. This will then be 
followed by a comparison between the titling approach and the fragmentation 
of land rights approach in achieving tenure security, as they find application in 
the previous 2002 Communal Land Rights Bill and the current Act. In this 
discussion, the viewpoints of various academics will be analysed and 
discussed.  
 
7 1 1 Transfer and Registration of Communal Land 
The Communal Land Rights Act registration procedure differs somewhat from 
the conventional way of registration. This is, however no surprise, since 
communal tenure has its own unique characteristics and contents.355 The 
legislature had to take these factors into account in its attempt to adhere to 
section 25(6) and (9) of the Constitution. Section 5 of the Communal Land 
Rights Act, coupled with the above-mentioned section 4, is regarded as 
“imperative,” as both these sections attempt to realise security of tenure.356 
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This is done through the registration procedure as set out in section 5. Section 
5(1) of the Act provides that “communal land and new order rights are capable 
of being registered and must be registered in the name of the community, 
including women, entitled to such land or right in terms of this Act and the 
relevant community rules.” From this section it is apparent that only new order 
rights are capable of being registered. Therefore section 5(1) also implies that 
“old order rights” first have to go through the process set out in section 18 of 
the Act. Section 5(1) also expressly provides that land and a “new order right” 
may be registered in the name of women. This is yet another much appreciated 
insertion in the Act.357 
 
The Communal Land Rights Act does not provide however, for a community or 
individuals to apply to the Minister for the transfer and registration of land. 
Transfer and registration will take place, after the conversion, confirmation or 
cancellation of “old order rights.” This whole process falls within the prerogative 
of the Minister. The wide discretionary powers awarded to the Minister in terms 
of the discussed section 18, is still relevant. At least in terms of the transfer and 
registration of land, there is a limitation. Transfer and registration will only take 
place after the conduct of a land rights enquiry and only when it is 
recommended by the enquirer. 
 
Section 5(2) of the Communal Land Rights Act provides for transfer of land to 
communities or individuals, irrespective of how they acquired the initial title. 
The Act, as a whole, attempts to award state-owned land to communities or 
individuals and at the same time it confirms the ideal of providing land to 
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women. Section 5(2) of the Act provides that if communal land is registered in 
the name of a person,358 or a traditional leader,359 or traditional leadership,360 a 
communal property association361 or a trust or legal entity;362 ownership of the 
land will still vest in the community on whose behalf such land was held. This 
provision attempts to rectify perception of traditional leaders that communal 
land belong to them, despite the fact that they are truly only administering it on 
behalf of a specific community.363 By inserting this section into the Act, the 
legislature wanted to make sure that any of the mentioned parties will no longer 
lay personal claim to land that they are merely controlling on behalf of the 
larger community.364 However, the limitations and restrictions that have been 
placed on land or the rights in land will remain as such. This is to ensure the 
consistent use, enjoyment and occupancy of said land. 
 
Since the community on whose behalf the land was held remains the lawful 
owners of the land, it is necessary that the existing title deed or any mortgage 
bond or other registered deed, be endorsed by the Register of Deed to reflect 
the real title holder. This is exactly what is provided for in section 5(2)(b) of the 
Act. By doing this, tenure security is awarded to previously disadvantaged 
communities and individuals. 
 
As mentioned before, the transfer and subsequent registration of land will only 
occur after the relevant provisions of section 18(4) have been taken into 
account by the Minister. Section 18(4) provides that during the determination 
phase and before the actual determination, the Integrated Development Plan of 
each relevant municipality must be taken into account.365 Gender equality is yet 
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another issue to be taken into account, as well as which land will be reserved 
by the State, including local municipalities. The said reserved right or land must 
be either for a public purpose or in the interest of the general public366 or it 
must be necessary for the protection of affected land or rights in land.367 
 
The above-mentioned discussion and criticism show that registration of land or 
“new order rights” will only follow after the ministerial determination. Upon the 
registration of land or “new order rights” in the name of a community, the 
holders will become the lawful owners of that land. The community will also be 
indicated as such in the title deed. In the South African property law the Deeds 
Registry is regarded as indicating the true owner of land and as a way of 
recording derivative acquisition of land. What is interesting here is that the 
Deeds Registries Act368 has recently been amended. Specifically, the definition 
of “person” as contained in section 102 of the Deeds Registries Act has been 
amended, to include a community. As registered and lawful owners of land, 
reference in this context must be made to section 3 of the Communal Land 
Rights Act. Section 3 provides that a community acquires juristic personality 
with perpetual succession, upon the registration of their community rules. As 
an entity with juristic capacity, the community is now able to “acquire and hold 
rights and incur obligations”, according to section 3(a) of the Communal Land 
Rights Act. The said community is also able to own, encumber by mortgage, 
servitude or otherwise or to dispose of movable or immovable property.369 All 
these powers or entitlements of a newly registered community are in line with 
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the juristic personality awarded to a company in terms of the Companies Act.370 
According to Cilliers and Benade371 a company as a legal entity with juristic 
personality must be regarded as an independent entity, equipped with legal 
personality from the moment of registration. 
 
After the Minister has made the section 18 determination, he or she is obliged 
to transfer the communal land concerned to the community.372 This transfer is 
however subject to section 18(4), which deals with the external but necessary 
factors the Minister has to take into account when making the said 
determination. In order to affect proper transfer of the land in question, the 
Communal Land Rights Act also provides that the Minister is responsible for 
the preparation and approval of a communal general plan373 in terms of the 
Land Survey Act.374 The said communal general plan needs to be registered 
and a communal land register needs to be opened in terms of the Deeds 
Registries Act.375 This part of the Communal Land Rights Act seems to be in 
accordance with the requirements for the establishment sectional title 
scheme,376 as well as the procedure for the subdivision of land for the 
development of a new township, according to section 46 of the Deeds 
Registries Act.377 In the case of sectional titles, a sectional register also needs 
to be opened, but only after the draft sectional plan of the Surveyor-General 
has been approved.378 The developer must apply for the opening of a sectional 
title register to the Registrar of Deeds in the area where the land to be 
transferred is situated for the opening of a sectional title register and also for 
the registration of the said sectional title plan. The developer of such a scheme 
will have to lodge separate certificates of registered sectional title for each unit 
                                                 
370
 61 of 1973. 
371
 Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law at 4-15. 
372
 S 6(a) of the Communal Land Rights Act. 
373
 S 6(a)(i) of the Communal Land Rights Act. 
374
 8 of 1997. Badenhorst et al The Law of Property at 627. Badenhorst et al are of the opinion that since 
no provision in the Deeds Registries Act deals with communal land, section 6(b)(ii) of the Communal 
Land Rights Act will be relevant in this context. 
375
 47 of 1937. S 6(b)(ii) of the Communal Land Rights Act. 
376
 Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986. 
377
 47 of 1986. Van der Merwe Sectional Titles, Share Blocks & Time-Sharing 4td ed (2001) 6-19. 
378
 Van der Merwe Sectional Titles 6-19. 
112 
 
with the application. The Register will then be responsible for closing the entry 
for the developer’s title deed of the land in the relevant register.379 
 
Subsequent to the preparation and approval of the communal general plan and 
the registration and opening of the communal land register, the Minister can 
transfer a right in land to entitled beneficiaries, which could comprise of either 
individuals or communities.380 It is evident from this section that the 
Department of Land Affairs realised that not all rural dwellers are in favour of 
individualised ownership. Such members would then rather choose to have a 
secure statutory right to land but in the context of the wider community.381 In 
terms of the Act in the scenario described above, the Registrar of Deeds will 
then have to issue a Deed of Communal Land Right or any other appropriate 
deed to these individuals. The Act defines  a “Deed of Communal Land Right” 
as a deed in terms of which a “new order right” is registered in the name of a 
person.382 The Communal Land Rights Act also makes provision for individuals 
who initially wanted to acquire a secure right in the context of the broader 
community, to apply to the community for the conversion of a registered “new 
order right” into freehold ownership.383  
 
Freehold ownership in this instance is individual ownership of the land, which 
first was secured in terms of the Deed of Communal Land Right. The 
community will have to consider this application, subject to relevant provisions 
in the community rules and title conditions.384 Based on these provisions, the 
relevant community may approve or reject the application for the conversion. 
Should a community decide to approve an application for the conversion of a 
registered “new order right” into freehold, it has the authority to impose any 
condition on the said land, or reserve any right in favour of that particular 
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community.385 The reservation of a right in land could lead to unfair practices. 
The question that arises here is why more rights should be reserved in the 
name of a community, as provisions for this is already made in section 18(4)(a) 
of the Act. In this instance a right may be reserved by the State for public 
purposes, but this reservation may not be beneficial to a particular community. 
 
The Act also does not provide for an appeal procedure, which the applicant for 
the conversion can follow, if the application is rejected. This in itself could lead 
to unfair decision-making, since the community is under no obligation to justify 
their decision to anyone, except maybe to the applicant. However, the Act does 
not even provide that the applicant is entitled to written or oral reasons in case 
of the rejection of the application for conversion. Accordingly where a “new 
order right” is indeed converted to freehold, this should also be indicated and 
recorded as such. This will be done in the Deeds Registries and in the 
Communal Land Register and need to be endorsed as such. 
 
The Act contains yet another problematic innovation set out in section 7. 
According to section 7 an official employed by the Department of Land Affairs 
may perform the functions of a conveyancer. Traditionally this has not been 
allowed in the transfer of ownership and registration. Only admitted attorneys, 
who have passed a specialised conveyancing examination, have until now 
been permitted to perform these functions to effect registration on behalf of 
their clients.386 Since a conveyancer is responsible for the accuracy of certain 
facts in terms of section 15A of the Deeds Registries Act, read with Regulation 
44 of the same Act, the question arises whether the same responsibilities can 
be placed on the official of the Department of Land Affairs. The concession to 
give an official of the Department of Land Affairs the power to perform the 
functions of a conveyancer, is a rather unorthodox notion. One cannot help but 
wonder who will bear the risk of responsibility for mistakes in the registration 
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procedure: will it be the Department of Land Affairs or the official in his or her 
personal capacity? This seems like yet another provision where the 
consequences were not fully considered by the legislature.387 
 
The Act provides that all the costs intrinsically related to the surveying and 
transfer of the land will be carried by the State,388 since transfer and 
registration costs in general are usually substantial. This insertion was needed, 
especially in the light of severe poverty in communal areas.389 
 
It is doubtful whether the true owners will always be indicated as such in the 
recording procedures of “new order rights” in the Communal Land Register. 
Since these are only rights in land, it could exchange hands within a said 
community, without being properly recorded in the Communal Land Register of 
a particular community. Rural inhabitants will have to be informed properly as 
to why recording of rights are necessary, especially where there is a change of 
ownership of the said rights in land. 
 
Another problematic issue is the perception that registered land or a registered 
right in land will facilitate the provision of loans in that the title deeds can be 
used in securing loans from financial institutions.390 This was also the 
assumption when the Communal Property Associations Act391 was 
promulgated. Currently this goal has not been realised as many of the 
Communal Property Associations are dysfunctional for a variety of reasons, 
one of which relates to the incapability of Communal Property Associations’ to 
secure investment from the State or the private sector.392 Another reason for 
the dysfunctionality of Communal Property Associations is that these bodies 
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are unable to derive profit.393 The financial progress envisaged in securing 
Communal Property Association’s has not materialised and it seems as if some 
of these mistaken projections have repeated itself in the Communal Land 
Rights Act.394 
 
With regard to the actual registration mechanism of “new order rights,” if the 
accuracy and reliability of the current registration system in South Africa is to 
be maintained and at the same time unknown numbers of “new order rights” 
have to be registered, the current system will with no doubt have to be 
amended. Restricted volumes of deeds registrations currently take place, due 
to the exclusive nature of the registration of title by way of deeds and the 
thorough examination procedure conducted before any registration.395 
Consequently, not only the reliability of the registration system but also the 
accuracy of the deeds registry are ensured. The current registration system is 
however still problematic. It is relatively slow, time-consuming and 
expensive.396 The White Paper made valuable recommendations in this 
regard,397 but to date none of it has surfaced in practice. Some of these 
recommendations however seem to find application in the Communal Land 
Rights Act and include the establishment and maintenance of a comprehensive 
land information system, as well as the compilation of a comprehensive state 
land register which would improve the management of communal land.398 In 
the Communal Land Rights Act this is done by the creation of a Deed of 
Communal land register. 
 
Collecting and maintaining cadastral and topographic information is also 
recommended. The Communal Land Rights Act requires that a communal 
general plan be prepared and approved in terms of the Land Survey Act.399 
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This recommendation is adhered to sufficiently. The costs of surveying 
communal land will be borne by the Department of Land Affairs, as no express 
provision is made for this. 
 
Since registration in the context of communal land plays such an important role 
with regard to publicity and tenure security, the process will have to be 
expedited. For some time now the Department of Land Affairs has been 
investigating the possibility of a fully computerised registration system. It was 
envisaged in the White Paper.400 This electronic transfer of deeds will 
accommodate more registrations, without the loss of reliability and accuracy. It 
will also be able to cater for the registration of “new order rights.” Pienaar 
contends that conveyancers who are electronically linked to the central Deeds 
Registry will be able to make paperless lodgings, while at the same time it will 
be possible to verify electronic information in order to effect transfer of real 
rights.401 Simultaneous electronic transactions, for example the cancellation of 
existing mortgage bonds and the registration of new ones, are anticipated, 
without having to resort to the time-consuming procedure of investigation. 
There are many advantages to having such an electronic registration system. 
These include the speeding up of the process of registration and the handling 
of a large number of transactions within a relatively short period of time. The 
duplication of functions between the various role players in the registration 
process402 will also be avoided. This electronic registration process will also 
most likely lead to a reduction of registration costs, since it is currently an 
expensive endeavour.403 
 
Possible obstacles faced by the registration of fragmented use-rights seem to 
be addressed by the Communal Land Rights Act. The Act provides for the 
preparation and approval of a communal general plan in terms of the Land 
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Survey Act.404 This suggests that prior to the transfer of communal land or a 
right in land it will have to be surveyed in order to be indicated in the communal 
general plan. The Communal Land Rights Act also provides for the resolution 
of conflicting land tenure rights before any registration can take place and that 
costs relating to the survey of communal land and the subsequent registration 
of it will be borne by the State. This is an important insertion, especially in the 
light of what has been said previously about poverty in these rural areas. 
 
7 1 2 Securing Women’s Land Rights 
The Act provides for tenure security for women in section 4(2) and (3). Section 
4(2) states: 
“An old order right held by a married person, is despite any law, 
practice, usage or registration to the contrary, deemed to be held by 
all spouses in a marriage in which such person is a spouse, jointly in 
undivided shares irrespective of the matrimonial property regime 
applicable to such marriage and must, on confirmation or conversion 
in terms of section 18(3), be registered in the names of all such 
spouses.” 
Section 4(3) states: 
“A woman is entitled to the same legally secure tenure, rights in or to 
land and benefits from land as is a man, and no law, community or 
other rule, practice usage may discriminate against any person on 
the ground of the gender of such person.” 
Despite the fact that these two provisions are so explicit in awarding 
security of tenure to women, experience and community workshops in 
communal areas have proven otherwise.405 Land in customary tenure, is 
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seen as a family asset and it is doubtful whether the insertion of section 
4(2) and (3) will have the desired effect, which is to provide tenure security 
to women. During the consultative processes concerning the 2002 and the 
2003 Communal Land Rights Bill, women fiercely voiced their concern and 
the problems they face in these communal areas.406 Section 4(2) of the 
Communal Land Rights Act does not provide that rights previously 
reserved for men only must now be shared by their wives. What is does 
provide for is that old order rights held by a married person is now deemed 
to be held jointly by his or her spouse. To a lesser extent and only in very 
few communities were single women allocated land. These land rights 
then qualify as old order rights in the terminology of the Act. If section 4(2) 
is applied in these circumstances, it means that upon the marriage of a 
single lady, her land rights will be held in joint terms with her new 
husband. In the few rural areas where land has been allocated to women, 
despite the concern of the traditional authorities in these areas, that the 
land will belong to outsiders upon the death of such a single lady, the 
wording of section 4(2) may impact negatively on women’s rights in these 
areas. It will have a negative impact both on future land allocations to 
other single women in rural areas, and it will also have a negative impact 
on the partial and uneven processes of change, currently and slowly 
taking place in rural areas.407 The relationship between the children and 
the stepfather will also be adversely affected, since he is now the co-
owner of the allocated land together with their mother, but to their 
exclusion. Section 4(2) is indeed a victory for women’s land rights but as is 
clear from the above discussion, the Act should have taken greater 
cognisance of the potential negative effect of this section on children born 
to a single mother who received land, and the new husband. 
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7 2 The Paradigm Shift: “Titling” v “Tenure” 
The policy behind tenure reform manifested itself in the Communal Land Rights 
Act in a fairly unknown way. It entails a compromise between the registration of 
communal title in the name of a community and the registration of fragmented 
use-rights in an attempt to secure tenure. Previous versions of the Act did not 
adhere to this compromise and only focussed on the titling paradigm.408 This 
approach was criticised severely. In order to understand the current approach 
adopted in the Communal Land Rights Act this approach will be discussed in 
detail. Many academics409 however agree that the policy as entailed in the 
2004 Act is the more obvious method to secure tenure. 
The registration and subsequent protection of “new order rights” are expressly 
provided for in the White Paper on South African Land Policy and also in the 
property clause of the 1996 Constitution. In the White Paper it is stated that 
“tenure reform must move towards rights and away from permits."410 In even 
clearer terms the White Paper provided that a “rights-based approach and 
adjudicatory principles have to be adopted, which recognise and accommodate 
de facto vested rights (i.e. those which exist on the ground).” In the case of the 
Constitution, section 25(1) provides for the protection of different rights in 
property. This caters not only for ownership, but also for other informal use-
rights.411 
 
The following principles guided the development of policy decisions behind 
tenure reform412 and as stated already, most of these principles surface in the 
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Act. The White Paper413 proposes that tenure reform must move towards the 
recognition of land rights and that the current system of permits to occupy 
should be abolished. A unitary non-racial system of land rights for all South 
African must be achieved through tenure reform. People who will be affected 
by tenure legislation “must” be allowed to decide on the most appropriate 
tenure system to be applicable to their exceptional circumstances. This 
provision is contained in the Communal Land Rights Act,414 yet no indication is 
provided as to what the different tenure systems are and what the content of 
each tenure system is. This amounts to a choice by affected communities or 
individuals to either hold land communally with respect to the available 
resources or to award each household sole ownership of an allocated piece of 
land or a right in land, with the option to upgrade the land right into freehold at 
a later stage. A right in land indicates that it might be something less than 
ownership, a fragmented right not to be equated with ownership but which will 
still be protected in terms of the Communal Land Rights Act. This fragmented 
right could either be a right to use, enjoy, occupy or cultivate the land or a 
combination of these. 
 
It is evident from these policy principles guiding tenure reform that the 
legislature and the drafters of the White Paper recognised that freehold 
ownership should not be the only choice in securing the land rights. 
Fragmented land rights as they are currently exercised should also receive the 
recognition and protection through the process of registration. However, this 
approach is not sufficiently obvious in previously promulgated legislation, 
although protection and recognition were awarded to certain categories of land 
rights in the Communal Property Associations Act (CPAA)415 and the Extension 
of Security of Tenure Act (ESTA)416 respectively.417 
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According to Van der Walt it is exactly these policy choices relating to land 
reform that have been central to transformation in South Africa.418 Leading 
South African academics such as Van der Walt,419 Pienaar,420 Mostert,421 and 
Cousins422 are of the opinion that fragmented use-rights should receive greater 
explicit recognition in appropriate legislation and coupled with the registration 
of these rights. Van der Walt is of the opinion that policy decisions relating to 
land are often not only unclear but also inconsistent. Although this statement 
was made back in 1999, it is still very relevant today in relation to the 
Communal Land Rights Act. It is Van der Walt’s contention that the policy 
choices relating to land reform in general have important and essential 
implications for both the efficacy of the process, as well as for the course and 
the effectiveness of “transformation in the legal, social, economic and political 
spheres in general.”423 In the South African context of tenure reform, provision 
was made in the White Paper for freehold ownership as well as for the 
upgrading of insecure second-class black land rights.424 
 
Previously only ownership and limited real rights were protected by their 
eligibility to be registered. This is largely due to the traditional civil-law 
hierarchy, concepts and institutions, underpinning the South African law of 
property.425 As such registered land title was the ultimate privilege on which the 
system of apartheid was built, as a result of political choices.426 The 
hierarchical civil-law property system operating in South Africa had the effect 
that black land rights were weak and insecure as opposed to ownership. This 
left black residents largely unprotected. The division between black land rights 
and white land rights was not only based on racial-political choices and 
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decisions, but it was also strengthened by the traditional civil-law hierarchy of 
property rights.427 The tenure leg of the land reform programme therefore has 
to address the inequalities in land allocation and the various degrees in which 
ownership and mere rights were protected, but it will also have to “overcome 
the structural inequalities in land distribution that were built into this hierarchical 
system of land rights, as it appeared from the relative strength and 
weaknesses of white and black land rights and the unequal distribution of 
wealth and power supported by them.”428 The 1997 White Paper on Land 
Policy recognised that land rights awarded to blacks during the previous 
political dispensation urgently needed legal recognition and protection through 
registration. This was not evident in the initial Land Rights Bill or the much 
criticised 2003 Communal Land Rights Bill. It appeared that tenure legislation 
such as the Conversion of Certain Rights into Leasehold or Ownership Act,429 
the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act,430 the Land Reform (Labour 
Tenants) Act,431 ESTA and the Communal Property Associations Act still 
favour the notion of ownership.432 By doing this the current hierarchical 
structures that formed the basis of Apartheid are upheld.433 It is therefore of 
utter importance that the policy behind tenure reform should rather be in favour 
of the fragmentation or diversification of land rights. Fragmentation in the 
context of tenure reform implies the following: The traditional civil-law hierarchy 
of land rights should be abolished and should be replaced by creating legally 
strong and recognised land rights that can be registered.434 These newly 
created land rights should be able to accommodate certain and specific needs 
and requirements. 
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This titling or ownership-paradigm was favoured by the 2003 Communal Land 
Rights Bill, whereby land titles were to be issued to either communities or 
individuals. As was mentioned previously, apartheid land laws were 
promulgated to exclude blacks from becoming lawful owners of land in the 
country, and the basis for this exclusion was by way of issuing title deeds 
which awarded ownership of land to whites only. Ownership was upheld 
through the civil-law hierarchical paradigm. In terms of this, it meant that 
ownership was exclusive and was enforceable against anyone attempting to 
interfere with the rights and benefits flowing from it.435 In the South African law 
of property, ownership is often described as being a “mother right,” while 
limited real rights such as mortgage and servitudes are described as deriving 
from ownership.436 
 
It has been argued that an effective land reform policy needs to move away 
from its traditional western ownership paradigm.437 If this is not done, a system 
based on ownership as the paradigmatic right, will necessarily have a hierarchy 
of stronger and weaker rights.438 Instead the land reform policy should move 
towards a system that will inevitably lead to the promotion and development of 
stronger use rights. A fragmented use-rights paradigm will also result in a 
variety of land rights, which will be incapable of being classified as stronger or 
weaker rights, since each right will now be recognised. These rights will also 
have legislative protection based on merit and the contents of each right. The 
acceptance of a use-rights paradigm will also be weaken or even restrict the 
scope and protection awarded to ownership and this, according to Van der 
Walt,439 might lead to the redistribution of wealth and power.440  
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It is exactly at this point that De Soto441 crosses swords with Van der Walt and 
Pienaar.442 Van der Walt and Pienaar are in favour of a use-rights paradigm in 
order to achieve wealth and power, whereas De Soto opines that ownership as 
the opposing paradigm in third world countries such as South Africa is the way 
to achieve wealth and power. The aforementioned academics also feel that 
since the use-rights paradigm is incorporated in land reform policy, it will have 
to be incorporated in the promulgation of new laws attempting to achieve a 
greater degree of equal distribution of land. This is exactly what is done in the 
Communal Land Rights Act. 
 
De Soto on the other hand is of the opinion that ownership should be awarded 
to those who are in beneficial occupation of land, but who have for many 
decades lacked secure title to that land. He argues that assets being held as 
“extra-legal property” need to be mobilized, since only formal legal property has 
the properties and functions that can lead to development and wealth 
distribution. This is done through fixing the economical potential of assets; by 
integrating dispersed information in one system that will be able to transcend 
the typically local operations of extra-legal assets; by making people 
accountable and last but not least by networking people and protecting their 
transactions.443 It is this kind of formal property, as they are held in the West 
that has led to capitalism and wealth. According to De Soto, the poor are in 
possession of “vast hectares of land in defective form.”444 The land is defective 
in that it is not “sufficiently” codified and fungible to have a broad range of 
applications, aside from its own geographic parameters.445 He therefore 
classifies these assets being held in defective form as “dead capital,” because 
they cannot be turned into liquid capital.446 The “dead capital” can neither be 
traded outside its narrow confines, nor can it be used as collateral for 
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productive investment.447 Despite third world governments’ attempts to 
formalise their property laws, in order to make it more accessible for the poor, 
most citizens still cannot get access.448 This is the result of bad, cumbersome 
and over-bureaucratised legal and administrative systems, according to De 
Soto.449 New property law must therefore be in line with existing social 
contracts and legitimacy450 and capable of being codified.451 Governments 
must create a social contract with holders of extra-legal property and capital, in 
order to achieve wealth. Only then, he argues, the globalization of capital, 
which has failed throughout the Third World and the former communist states, 
can become complete. This ownership-paradigm advocated by De Soto was 
attempted in Kenya. It failed dismally because of the distinct nature of African 
communal tenure, the flexibility of boundaries and the fact that land rights 
ingrained in African society were not taken into account.452 
 
The said ownership-paradigm favoured by De Soto is based on a hierarchy of 
rights, whereas in the case of the fragmented use-rights paradigm no such 
hierarchy exists.453 In the latter instance this is because rights are recognised 
and protected in terms of legislation. In the case of the ownership-paradigm 
title and use almost always vests in one person. Although restrictions or limited 
real rights can exist in favour of other parties, once they lapse or fall away, 
ownership reverts to its full extent. In the case of limited real rights being 
awarded to another person in terms of a piece of land, this implies that 
ownership is the principal right and that other rights “derive from, depend upon 
and are weaker than ownership.”454 This point also illustrates the hierarchy of 
power, in terms of which an owner’s tenure security are recognised in law 
through the title it held. The security of the lesser rights is either because of 
their status and title as being limited real rights, or because they have no 
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legally defined title. The above discussion once again proves how the civil-law 
hierarchy of ownership will be upheld, if ownership should be retained as the 
ultimate paradigm in securing tenure. 
 
Where tenure legislation is based on fragmented use rights, it necessarily 
implies that title and use will be separated most of the time and that the amount 
of security awarded to the use-rights is regulated by legislation.455 Since the 
use-rights are awarded and protected by legislation, they will be flexible in 
nature and in content. At the same time it will also be possible to create infinite 
new rights depending on the needs of the landless.456 This is exactly what is 
needed in the rural areas in South Africa, since there are hundreds of 
conflicting and overlapping land rights that need flexibility to secure each right 
according to its contents. In this way more rights will be created and secured at 
the same time. 
 
Van der Walt and Pienaar457 opine that the above-mentioned fragmented use 
rights model is the most logical one for South Africa, given the diverse forms of 
existing land tenure rights. However the fragmented use rights model has 
inherent problems. The primary problem relates to the fact that title and land 
use are separated and that security are awarded by legislation only.458 The 
Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act,459 the Interim Protection of Land Rights 
Act460 and the Extension of Security of Tenure Act461 all follow this approach, 
where use rights are recognised and protected by legislative measures. These 
use rights can sometimes only be protected by way of a court order, arbitration 
or mediation, which in itself can be a time-consuming process. For the duration 
of a dispute, the property will be taken from the property market. 
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The objectives of land tenure reform should at all times be kept in mind. This 
relates for instance to the reduction of poverty, the promotion of economic 
growth and the establishment of a land management system supporting 
sustainable land-use patterns. Where a dispute relating to the legitimacy of a 
land right or use-rights exists in terms of the said legislation, the objectives of 
tenure reform will be achieved. Pienaar states that the main reason why these 
rights are insecure is that the rights conferred by legislation do not comply with 
the publicity principle.462 The use rights is only certain once it is confirmed by a 
court order, arbitration, mediation or a mere agreement between the disputing 
parties. According to Pienaar “some kind of individualisation has to take place” 
in order for tenure security in communal areas to become a reality.463 This 
individualisation needs to be confirmed in the form of the registration of title, as 
legislation is insufficient to obtain security of tenure. In this instance Pienaar 
states that separating title and use often leads to insecurity of tenure. If the use 
rights of occupiers of communal land were not only protected by legislation, but 
also through registration, stronger security of tenure would be accomplished. In 
this way the use-rights of individuals and communities will become concrete 
and individualised by an applicable system of governance.464 
Pienaar further highlights a more practical problem. He predicts that financial 
institutions will be less willing to provide loans against security of a use-right 
awarded by legislation only, since this right might be the object of future 
disputes. This will in effect lead to the State having to fund any potential 
development projects, by its already limited resources and inadequate 
budget.465 This will result in use rights still being regarded as weak and even as 
possible second-class rights. Financing must therefore not only come from the 
State but also from the private sector or maybe even the international 
community, in order to facilitate and encourage sustainable development in 
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rural areas.466 This in itself could be a result of use rights being awarded to 
occupiers and the fact that they are individualised and registered in the name 
of the lawful owner of the right.  
Cousins467 agrees with Van der Walt468 and Pienaar469 to a certain extent. 
Tenure security will succeed by awarding legislative protection of fragmented 
use-rights.470 Cousins is however, not in favour of registering the fragmented 
use-rights (or new order rights as they are envisaged in the Communal Land 
Rights Act.). Cousins opine that the protection awarded to these rights in 
legislation is sufficient to secure tenure. He backs up his arguments by relying 
on lessons learned from Communal Property Associations in South Africa.471 
Since 1996 over 500 group titles have been issued to Communal Property 
Associations. Many are currently dysfunctional for a variety of reasons, for 
instance because the constitutions of these associations were too 
sophisticated for intended beneficiaries and because they lacked continued 
financial support from the relevant government bodies.472  
 
As indicated above, the Communal Land Rights Act attempts to strike a 
compromise between the ownership-paradigm and a fragmented use-rights 
paradigm. At the same time it also adheres to the policy regarding tenure 
security as set out in the White Paper. The Department of Land Affairs 
however will have to conduct more research on the feasibility of this, especially 
with reference to other African countries such as Tanzania and Mozambique, 
where this compromise was applied with success.473 In these two countries 
securing tenure was also a lengthy and painstaking process, but according to 
Cousins, this compromise provided a much better option than titling. In 
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Tanzania and Mozambique the use of communal land is recognised and 
protected. At the same time the communal land rights are statutorily awarded 
the status of property rights, without conversion into private ownership rights as 
they are known in the West. In these two countries it is also recognised that the 
land should vest in the people who have been occupying it for centuries. Right-
holders are enabled by a general applicable law to define and record their own 
land rights on a local level. Government however still supports and facilitates 
the recording of the rights at local level, to maintain the continuing different 
levels of social organisation. Although the South African Communal Land 
Rights Act shows some similarities to security of tenure as applied in the said 
two countries, their tenure reform mechanisms are simplified and outcomes-
based. 
 
7 3  Assessment  
It is evident from this discussion that the Legislature tried to give effect to the 
White Paper on South Africa’s Land Policy. It is also clear that the securing of 
de facto weak and insecure rights in land, into de iure secure ones, is a priority 
of the Department of Land Affairs. The compromise between titling and 
fragmentation is a useful tool in this regard, although the content of new order 
rights will still have to be addressed sufficiently in the regulations to the 
Communal Land Rights Act. This chapter aimed to provide the reader with an 
understanding as to the efforts to secure current insecure land tenure rights. 
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CHAPTER 8:   CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
 
8 1 Background 
The constitutionality of the Communal Land Rights Act has come under scrutiny 
in a pending lawsuit involving the Legal Resources Centre,474 acting on behalf 
of the affected communities and the Department of Land Affairs.475  
 
The Legal Resources Centre represents four communities in their bid to have 
the Communal Land Rights Act declared invalid. The communities concerned 
are the community living in Dixie village in Limpopo province, the Mayaeyane 
community which falls within the broader Makgobistad area in the North West 
Province, and the Makuleke community, which is located in the far north-east of 
South Africa near the Kruger National Park.476 The Kalkfontein community is the 
first applicant in this constitutional challenge.477 The LRC is of the opinion that 
the Communal Land Rights Act gives too wide powers to the Minister of Land 
Affairs which in itself might prejudice affected communities, since the 
communities were not allowed to make any submissions with regard to the last 
version of the ultimate Act.478 
 
The focus in this chapter is on the pivotal provisions of section 18 of the Act, 
which lie at the heart of the constitutionality debate. Section 18 grants the 
Minister of Land Affairs479 broad discretionary powers in the award of land 
rights to rural communities. The content of these provisions will be explained 
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against the backdrop of the constitutional mandate for the Communal Land 
Rights Act, and its goals in relation to the system to be established in terms of 
the Act. The basis upon which the constitutionality of the Communal Land 
Rights Act is contested will then be considered. 
 
8 2 Summary of Different Communities’ Constitutional 
Challenges 
The constitutional challenge is brought by the communities of Kalkfontein, Dixie, 
Mayaeyane and Maluleke. 
8 2 1 The Kalkfontein Community 
The forbearers of the Kalkfontein community clubbed together to buy rural land 
north of Pretoria.480 In 1979 the National Party government created a tribal 
authority in constructing the KwaNdebele homeland.481 The three privately 
owned Kalkfontein farms became part of the area over which the tribal authority 
gained jurisdiction. The said community was not a heterogeneous group of 
people. They were ethnically mixed.482 The tribal authority was fiercely resisted 
by the descendants of the initial Kalkfontein purchasers and as a result a 
commission of enquiry was instituted. As a result of the enquiry the newly 
“created” chief was deposed and replaced and his successor’s powers were 
curtailed by a court order. However, despite the recommendations of the 
commission, the tribal authority was never disbanded. A court order of fifteen 
years ago which also provided for the disbanding of the tribal authority and the 
transfer title to the Kalkfontein community as owners from the Minister of Land 
Affairs, has been adhered to. The Minister therefore still holds the land in trust 
on behalf of the Kalkfontein community.483 Claassens and Gilfillan state that the 
opposition of this particular community to the “unilateral actions of an imposed 
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chief does not imply a rejection of indigenous values or institutions.”484 This is 
evident because for over eighty years this community has chosen to exercise 
their ownership rights through familiar and valued indigenous systems. These 
practices have supported accountability in these areas and have led to flexible 
responses for change, especially from women. 
 
The Kalkfontein community’s constitutional challenge relates to the fact that the 
Communal Land Rights Act, together with the Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Act,485 entrench the status and power of disputed tribal 
authorities. The Kalkfontein communities are therefore afraid that the 
Communal Land Rights Act may result in the opposed tribal authority being 
vested with the power to allocate land rights and to represent the residents as 
the “owner” of the communal land, if they are reconstituted as a traditional 
council, as required by the Act. According to the Kalkfontein community, these 
were the very powers that were used and abused by the tribal authority once 
created, to undermine the ownership rights of the Kalkfontein residents. 
According to Claassens and Gilfillan the Kalkfontein community fears that the 
Communal Land Rights Act will lead to a reversal of their “hard-fought efforts to 
contain abuse of power by the tribal authority, and that the Act jeopardises their 
ongoing efforts to exercise their ownership rights independently.”486 
 
8 2 2 The Dixie Community 
In the case of the Dixie community the focus is on the decision-making power at 
village level relative to the power of the larger Mnisi Traditional Council to make 
unilateral decisions about the land used by the community. The Dixie 
community was almost evicted as a result of a development of a tourism lodge. 
Court papers in a land restitution dispute involving the same land exposed and 
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proved the traditional councils underhand dealings with unscrupulous investors 
in anticipation of a restitution award.487 
 
In April 2001 residents of Dixie heard for the first time of a 99-year lease 
agreement between Curato Investments and the Mnisi Tribal Authority. This 
agreement was concluded to develop a tourism lodge on part of the Dixie land. 
This would result in the relocation of some of the residents. Moreover their 
access to a river, used for domestic purposes and watering livestock, would be 
limited.488 Reckson Ntimane, the Dixie community leader repeatedly requested 
information about payment and compensation arrangements and he also 
wanted to know why those affected have not been consulted. A community 
meeting was arranged by the Mnisi Tribal Authority, and when Mr Ntimane 
posed these questions again, he was arrested and briefly incarcerated.489 The 
development of the tourism lodge on part of the Dixie land later appeared to 
have been supported by the provincial Department of Land Affairs as various 
meetings had already taken place between the department and the Mnisi Tribal 
Authority, but without the participation of the Dixie community. 
 
The Dixie community approached the Legal Resources Centre, who on their 
behalf wrote to the Minister of Land Affairs. This was done since the community 
knew that as long as the land remained registered as “state-owned former 
SADT land,” any transactions pertaining to such land will be invalid unless it is 
signed off by the Minister of Land Affairs. After receiving this letter, the 
Department of Land Affairs replied in writing and admitted that no consultation 
had taken place with the affected Dixie community. Based on this, the 
department agreed to arrange a meeting between the Chief Mnisi, the Mnisi 
Tribal Authority and the Dixie community. 
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This meeting was never scheduled. Instead the village headmen and two other 
Dixie residents were summoned to the offices of the Mnisi tribal authority. Here 
they were summarily informed of the long term lease agreement, concluded 
with Curato Investments in respect of the lodge. Since the information was 
presented as a fait accompli, the Dixie community applied for an urgent interdict 
against Curato Investments, the Mnisi Tribal Authority and the Department of 
Land Affairs. The lawyers of the investors then replied and informed the 
community that the lease agreement had not been signed and as a result of 
their experience with the community, they want nothing further to do with the 
community.490  
 
The Dixie community is challenging the Communal Land Rights Act because of 
their experience with the traditional authority. According to Reckson Ntimane, 
their constitutional challenge relates to the powers allocated to the land 
administration committee. He states that the Dixie villagers would not have 
been able to stop the deal if the Mnisi Tribal Authority had the powers of a land 
administration committee or been able to represent the community “as the 
owner of the land” as proposed by the Communal Land Rights Act. Ntimane 
also contended that the powers awarded by the Act to traditional councils acting 
as a land administration committee will undermine existing decentralised 
participatory decision-making processes in the villages. Currently decisions in 
the Dixie community are taken at village meetings convened by the headmen in 
consultation with the development forum which included the water committee, 
the policing forum, the school governing body and representatives of women 
and the youth.491  
 
The Dixie villagers furthermore question the fact that they are part of the Mnisi 
Tribal Authority, especially since the Dixie farm is not among the list of farms 
referred to in the 1962 Government Gazette Notice, which established the Mnisi 
Tribal Authority. This contention of the Dixie community was strongly opposed 
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by Chief Mnisi. In itself the jurisdiction of the Mnisi Tribal Authority over Dixie is 
legally tenuous. 
 
8 2 3 The Mayaeyane Area near Makgobistad 
Unlike the Dixie case, the applicants from this area are not questioning the 
legitimacy of the tribal council or that the community falls within its 
boundaries.492 What they are opposing is the fact that they have inherited land 
rights in a relatively isolated agricultural area called Mayaeyane, which is far 
away from Makgobistad. The young chief of Makgobistad appointed his uncle, 
as the unofficial headmen of Mayaeyane. The Mayaeyane community is also 
accusing this unofficial headman for spearheading the development of a 
housing project in the area without consulting them. Mayaeyane is surrounded 
by a previously white-owned farm, which has recently been awarded to them in 
settlement of a restitution claim. The broader community has not been informed 
about any developments regarding the settlement of the restitution claim and 
are opposing the Restitution Commission’s requirement that the land be 
transferred to a legal entity such as a trust or a communal property association. 
They traditional council in this case proposed that title of the land must be 
transferred to the chief or the traditional council. This proposal is strongly 
contested by the Mayaeyane community. 
 
In the Mayaeyane case, the applicants are challenging the right of the chief and 
his uncle to make unilateral decisions relating to land that have been in 
possession of Mayaeyane families from time immemorial. They are also 
challenging the chief’s right to appoint a headman without consulting them. In 
essence the Mayaeyane applicants fear that the Communal Land Rights Act 
and the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act will exacerbate 
the tendency towards high-handed and self-serving behaviour by traditional 
leaders.493 In this instance, the Constitutional Court will have to shed some light 
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on what the status of family-held land rights is relative to the power of chiefs  
over land. The sale of land acquired in terms of successful restitution claims will 
have to be properly sanctioned and the Constitutional Court will have to take a 
firm stance on this. 
 
8 2 4 The Makuleke Community 
The Makuleke community was forcibly removed from the land that they had 
historically occupied at Pafuri and was resettled at Ntlaveni. The Pafuri land 
was later incorporated into the Kruger National Park. The Makuleke community 
instituted a successful restitution claim in 1998 for this land based on an 
agreement that the land would be transferred to their CPA to be used for eco-
tourism development.494 The community will remain resident in the resettlement 
area of Ntlaveni, administered as an SADT “betterment” scheme.495 Ntlaveni 
falls within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Mhinga Tribal Authority as 
created in terms of the Bantu Authorities Act.496 The restitution claim was 
opposed by the new chief Cydrick, but was unsuccessful. 
 
The Makuleke community is challenging the Communal Land Rights Act based 
on concerns that this Act together with the Traditional Leadership and 
Governance Framework Act, would enable Mhinga, to undo their successful 
restitution claim. According to them, title to Parfuri has already been transferred 
to the Makuleke Communal Property Association, and they have entered into 
eco-tourism ventures with investment partners.497 These ventures are 
respectively managed by the Makuleke Development Trust and the Makuleke 
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Empowerment Trust. Since section 5 of the Communal Land Rights Act, 
enables the Minister to endorse title deeds of Communal Property Association’s 
and trusts to communities administered by traditional councils acting as a land 
administration committee, this may render their tenure insecure all over 
again.498 
The Makuleke community also contests their forced removal to an area which 
effectively placed them within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Mhinga Tribal 
Authority. Their efforts paid off when the Ralushai Commission recommended 
that the separate status of the Makuleke community be restored. This was 
however to no avail. In the current constitutional challenge this restoration of the 
Makuleke as a separate community, not falling under the jurisdictional 
boundaries of the Mhinga Tribal Authority, will be vital. The answering affidavits 
of the Mhinga Tribal Authority reiterate this, as it underlines the validity of the 
community’s concerns. 
 
8 2 5 Assessment of the Claim 
From the above discussion it is clear that the Communal Land Rights Act is 
contested because of fears that traditional leaders will abuse their powers and 
undermine the land rights of women in the communities. The arguments of the 
appellants are interesting, but do not place enough emphasis on the failure of 
the Department of Land Affairs to give effect to the constitutional guarantee as 
entrenched in section 25(6) and (9) of the Constitution. Emphasis should also 
have been placed on the failure of government to provide more effective 
guidance in meeting the said constitutional objectives. These two grounds will 
subsequently be analysed and discussed to show how effective it could have 
been applied in the constitutional challenge of the Communal Land Rights Act.  
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8 3 Grounds for Constitutional Evaluation 
Grounds for contesting the constitutionality of the Communal Land Rights Act 
have been proposed by various institutions, including the Commission on 
Gender Equality (CGE),499 the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies 
(PLAAS) in co-operation with the National Land Committee (NLC) and the 
South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC).500 
 
For purposes of our discussion, the main objections against the Act may be 
classified as follows: First, the Communal Land Rights Act fails to give effect to 
the underlying constitutional right entrenched in section 25(6) and (9) and to 
determine the extent and nature of the right. Secondly, the Communal Land 
Rights Act fails to give constitutionally consistent guidance in the process of 
decision-making espoused by the Act. These contentions are analysed and 
evaluated in this part. 
 
8 3 1 Failure to Give Effect to the Underlying Constitutional Right 
Entrenched in Section 25(6) and (9) 
In respect of the first mentioned category of objections, section 25(6) and (9) of 
the Constitution obliges Parliament to adopt legislation to determine the extent 
to which a person or community will be entitled to legally secure tenure or to 
comparable redress. This point was also confirmed in Dawood and another v 
Minister of Home Affairs and Another; Shalabi and another v Minister of Home 
Affairs and Another.501 However, section 18(3) of the Communal Land Rights 
Act grants extensive discretionary powers to the Minister to give effect to this 
task. If the Minister decides to convert old-order rights into new-order rights, he 
or she may determine what the content and extent of the newly awarded right or 
rights will be, or cancel them, whatever the case may be. The Minister’s 
discretion is even extended as far as it affects a decision on whether or not 
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rights may be made legally secure at all. In addition, where comparable redress 
to a holder of an old order right is envisaged, the content and nature thereof is 
also in the discretion of the Minister.502 
 
Marcus is of the opinion that the Communal Land Rights Act does not give 
effect to the basic requirement of section 25(6) of the Constitution.503 In fact, 
both he and Budlender504 argue that the Communal Land Rights Act does not 
confer any entitlement to secure tenure or comparable redress on the intended 
beneficiaries. The Act does also not determine or provide the extent to which 
tenure is to be made legally secure or the extent to which comparable redress 
should be awarded.505 The main points of consideration in support of this 
argument may be summarized as follows: Whether a person is entitled to 
legally secure tenure, and the extent of such an entitlement remains entirely 
within the Minister’s discretion. Despite the fact that section 25(6) of the 
Constitution confers a constitutional right on people whose tenure is insecure, 
the Act provides that the effect that may be given to that right is entirely within 
the Minister’s discretion. In effect, the Communal Land Rights Act reduces a 
constitutionally entrenched right to a “nebulous something” dependent on the 
goodwill and/or convictions of the Minister. Should the reasoning of O’Regan J 
in Dawood be applied to the matter at hand, it would amount to the following, 
namely where an administrative discretion is given to an official by law, and that 
discretion might affect constitutional rights of a person, the law must also 
provide instructions to that official as to the manner in which the discretion must 
be exercised. This is to ensure that the discretion does indeed achieve the 
realization of the concerned rights.506 
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8 3 2 Failure to Provide Guidance in Meeting the Constitutional 
Objectives of the Communal Land Rights Act 
The second ground for contesting the validity of the Communal Land Rights Act 
is the fact that the Act makes the realization of constitutional rights subject to 
the exercise of official discretion. This is done in a manner that does not give 
adequate guidance, in constitutional terms, to officials as to how they should 
exercise that discretion. In Janse van Rensburg v Minister of Trade and 
Industry507 the Constitutional Court confirms this notion of constitutionally 
consistent guidance, by providing in clear terms that “the constitutional 
obligation on the Legislature to promote, protect and fulfill the rights entrenched 
in the Bill of Rights entails that where a wide discretion is conferred upon a 
functionary, guidance should be provided as to the manner in which those 
powers are to be exercised.” In Janse van Rensburg the Constitutional Court  
confirmed what has already been said in the Dawood and Shalabi-case508 
namely that laws should provide clear guidelines when constitutional rights are 
concerned and that constitutional right should not be dependent on the 
discretion of a Minister or a competent state functionary. In Janse van 
Rensburg Chaskalson CJ eloquently states that it is in the public interest that 
there should be certainty about the constitutionality of all legislation. Where no 
guidelines exist in leading the discretion of Ministers where constitutional rights 
are concerned, the law will not pass the test of constitutionality. A constitutional 
right cannot be dependent on Ministerial discretion. If this were allowed, the 
consequences would be disastrous. In the case of the Communal Land Rights 
                                                 
507
 2001 (1) SA 29 (CC) at par 25. Janse van Rensburg v Minister of Trade and Industry deals with the 
section 8(5)(a) of the Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practices) Act 71 of 1988. Section 8(5)(a)(i) of 
the Act empowers the Minister to (i) stay or prevent any unfair business practice, for a period not 
exceeding six months while an investigation is being undertaken into the alleged unfair business practice. 
This stay or prevention of unfair business practice by the Minister could only take place on the 
recommendation of the Consumer Affairs Committee. The Committee could also recommend (ii) the 
attachment of any money or property relating to the investigation. Both (i) and (ii) could be effected by 
way of a notice to the parties involved. According to a High Court section 8(5)(a) violated ss 22, 25 and 
33 of the 1996 Constitution and therefore it was unconstitutional. In confirming the High Court decision 
the CC confirmed that the ministerial discretion of the Minister of Trade and Industry in terms of section 
8(5)(a)(i) of the Act “could be fatal” to businesses. Chaskalson CJ also held in par 25 that the powers 
given to the Minister in terms of section 8(5)(a) were “sweeping and drastic,” and the Legislature had 
failed to in providing sufficient guidance in exercising the discretion. Although Chaskalson CJ 
considered the interim guidelines he concluded that the measures were never intended to be a guide to the 
Legislature in considering the remedial legislation and neither should it be used as precedents. 
508
 See Janse van Rensburg v Minister of Trade and Industry paras 42-48 in this regard.  
141 
 
Act, the impoverished rural dwellers who have been in urgent need of tenure 
security for decades will be the ones suffering detriment. 
 
Section 14(2) lists those issues which must be attended to by the land rights 
enquirer submitting a report to the Minister, on the basis of which the Minister 
then makes the determination envisaged in terms of section 18(1) and (4) of the 
Act. Although the list of matters to be considered are already rather long, thus 
making the process prone to lengthy delays, critically important factors have 
been omitted. The need to give effect to the constitutional right to legally secure 
tenure or comparable redress is not mentioned expressly, but may be read into 
the list of requirements due to the important provision in section 4 of the Act. 
However, if the list is extended further through a process of cross-reading, the 
factors the Minister must take into account when making a decision are 
rendered even more open-ended than it already is. In view of the fact that the 
law is supposed to instruct officials to exercise their administrative discretion 
which may affect the constitutional rights of individuals in a manner that 
achieves the realization of the rights concerned,509 this omission might lead to 
inconsistencies in decision-making. Although judicial review of the Minister’s 
decision is possible, it is no substitute for a constitutionally enforceable right.510 
 
The abovementioned arguments have merit for contesting the constitutional 
validity of the Act. Our judiciary has already had the opportunity to consider 
some of these aspects in different contexts. 
8 3 3 1 First Contention: Meeting the Objectives of Section 25(6) and 
(9) of the Constitution 
With regard to the contention that the Communal Land Rights Act does not give 
effect to the constitutional right underlying section 25(6) read with (9) of the Bill 
of Rights, the Constitutional Court’s dictum in S v Mbatha; S v Prinsloo511 is 
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 See para 46-48, 50 and 54-55 of the Dawood-case on this issue, as well as 2000(3) SA 963 (CC) and 
2000(8) BCLR 837 (CC). The judgment in the Dawood-case was delivered by Justice Kate O’Regan and 
was also unanimous. 
510
 This was held in Bel Porto School Governing Body and Others v Premier, Western Cape and Another 
2002 (3) SA 265 at para 83- 90. 
511
 1996 (2) SA 464 (CC) at para 23. These two cases dealt with a reverse onus in the Arms and 
Ammunition Act 75 of 1969. 
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important. There it was held that constitutionally entrenched rights cannot be 
dependent upon the exercise of discretion.512 This case involved a reverse 
onus in the Arms and Ammunition Act.513 The applicants in both cases 
challenged the constitutionality of section 40(1) the Arms and Ammunition Act. 
This section contained a presumption to assist the state to prove unlawful 
possession of arms and ammunition. The presumption shifted the burden of 
proof from the State to the accused. The Constitutional Court held that this 
presumption infringed the right of an accused to be presumed innocent in terms 
of section 25(3)(c) of the Interim Constitution.514 The Constitutional Court 
further held that the presumption could easily lead to the conviction of innocent 
people. In particular, it was stated that the rights of accused persons “are 
enshrined in the Constitution and do not depend on the discretion of the police 
or the Attorney-General to prosecute only in cases where the accused are in 
fact guilty.”515 
 
Upon more or less the same considerations, it may be argued that the 
Communal Land Rights Act is inconsistent with the Constitution. It seeks to 
transform a constitutionally guaranteed right into a discretionary benefit. The 
granting of such a benefit is, on the basis of section 18 of the Communal Land 
Rights Act, entirely subject to the discretion of the Minister.516 As such, it stands 
in direct contrast with section 25(6), which determines that legislation, and 
legislation alone, can determine the extent of the rights to legally secure tenure 
or comparable redress.517 
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 See also S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) at para 28 where the Constitutional Court made reference to 
the exercise of a discretion in the presumption of innocence. 
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 75 of 1969. 
514
 200 of 1993. 
515
 S v Mbatha at par 23.  
516
 Legal Resources Centre Submission to the Portfolio Committee for Land and Agriculture on the  
Communal Land Rights Bill [B67-2003] 10 Nov 2003 at 5. Also available at 
http://www.uwc.ac.za/PLAAS. Last visited on 2009-29-09. 
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 PLAAS and the National Land Committee Submission to the Portfolio Committee for Land and 
Agriculture on the Communal Land Rights Bill, 10 Nov 2003. Also available at online 
http://www.uwc.ac.za/PLAAS. Last visited on 2009-29-09. 
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In addition, the provisions dealing with comparable redress in the current Act 
give no indication of the factors or criteria to be considered in determining who 
will be entitled to comparable redress and to what extent. Section 18(3)(d)(iii) of 
the Act merely provides for conversion of so-called “old order rights” into either 
ownership or comparable new order rights, and that the Minister must 
determine the nature and extent of such rights. Apart from the fact that this is 
both vague and insufficient, it leaves the Minister to his or her own devices in 
deciding upon conversion, and the public in the dark as to the reasoning and 
processes behind such a decision-making effort. 
 
A further objection may be levelled at the ambiguity resulting from the 
ministerial discretion, based on a comparison between the restitution clause 
and the tenure security clause of the Constitution. According to Marcus, the 
structure of section 25(7), which deals with restitution, is similar to section 25(6) 
of the Constitution. However, section 25(7) confers an entitlement to restitution 
or to comparable redress on the class of people who qualify for it, to the extent 
provided by an Act of Parliament, which is the Restitution of Land Rights Act.518 
Section 2 of the Restitution Act sets out the circumstances under which people 
may be entitled to restitution of a right in land. It describes the extent of that 
right, the manner in which the right is to be exercised and how it is to be 
determined whether a particular individual falls within the class of persons who 
hold these rights.519 
 
By contrast, the Communal Land Rights Act does not set out any method for 
objectively determining whether an individual falls within the class of person 
who are to receive secure tenure or comparable redress, or even the extent of 
that tenure or redress. In fact, from the types of rights affected by the 
Communal Land Rights Act, it is evident that the Act caters for various types of 
“communal land.” In general, “communal land” is understood to be land 
occupied or used by a community or members thereof subject to the rules and 
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 22 of 1994. 
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 Dulabh v Department of Land Affairs 1997 (4) SA 1108 (LCC); Richtersveld Community v Alexkor 
Ltd 2001 (3) SA1293 (LCC); Chief Nchalbeleng v Chief Phasa 1998 (3) SA 578 (LCC) and also Abrams 
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customs of that community. Many of the types of “communal land” catered for in 
the Act relate to pre-1991 land-control forms. These types of land can be 
described as “classic” communal areas.520 However, the Communal Land 
Rights Act also goes beyond addressing the pre-1991 land regime, by being 
made explicitly applicable to “beneficiaries of communal land or land tenure 
rights in terms of other land-reform laws” and by catering for a number of “new” 
categories of communal land. It incorporates “land acquired by or for a 
community whether registered or not” and applies to “any other land, including 
land which provides equitable access to land to a community as contemplated 
in section 25(5) of the Constitution.” It hence apparently applies for instance 
also to land held by established communal property associations in terms of the 
Communal Property Associations Act (CPAA), to the extent to which the 
Minister may determine. 
 
Even the scope of the Communal Land Rights Act is therefore apparently 
intentionally formulated vaguely, to leave room for treatment of the many 
diverse types of communal rights that might need protection. The disadvantage 
of this approach is that it perpetuates the already broad discretionary powers of 
the Minister. Hence most matters are left to the discretion of the Minister, thus 
propagating patent disregard for the basic requirements of section 25(6) of the 
Constitution. 
 
8 3 3 2 Second Contention: Failure to Provide Consistent Guidance 
in Decision-Making 
With regard to the second contention mentioned above, i.e. the failure of the 
Communal Land Rights Act to provide constitutionally consistent guidance to 
decision-makers, some judicial authority already exists upon which to argue 
against the constitutionality of the Communal Land Rights Act. In Dawood and 
Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another; Shalabi and Another v Minister 
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 These include (i) state land which is beneficially occupied  and at any time vested in the governments 
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Development Trust;  (iii) land that was listed in the Schedule to the Black Land Act  before it was 
repealed;  (iv) land listed as “released areas” under the Development Trust and Land Act;  and (v) land 
subject to the KwaZulu-Natal Ingonyama Trust.  
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of Home Affairs and Another,521 the Constitutional Court was expected to 
pronounce on a similar argument, in a situation where a statute afforded an 
administrative official broad discretionary powers. The discretion in this context 
vested in officials from the Department of Home Affairs,522 who had to decide 
on the award of residence permits on a permanent or temporary basis. This 
discretion, it was argued, indirectly affected the right to family life of the relevant 
permit holder from her home country. This would effectively remove her from 
her family who was resident in South Africa.523 Hence it was argued that the 
discretion of the officials in relation to the issuing of residence permits was 
potentially detrimental to the applicant’s constitutional rights. 
 
Commenting upon the impact of such statutorily conferred discretionary powers 
on constitutional rights, the Constitutional Court distinguished, in an obiter 
dictum, between requiring a court or tribunal in exercising a discretion to 
interpret legislation in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution, and 
placing a broad discretion to the same effect on an official.524 Whereas 
legislative interpretation is one of the main functions of the judiciary, an 
administrative official may be untrained in law and in constitutional 
interpretation.525 It would therefore be unfair to assume that administrative 
officials can be expected to exercise a discretion conferred on them in a 
manner consistent with the Bill of Rights.526 Since officials are extremely busy 
and it is often expected of them to respond quickly and effectively to the many 
requests and applications for social grants or residential permits (temporary or 
permanent), the nature of their work does not always allow them to reflect 
carefully on the scope of constitutional rights or the circumstances in which a 
limitation of such rights would be justifiable.527  
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Accordingly, it is necessary in the eyes of the judiciary that sufficient guidelines 
be provided in legislation where administrative officials are expected to exercise 
statutorily conferred discretions. The Constitutional Court supported this view by 
stating that “it is an important principle of the rule of law that rules be stated in a 
clear and accessible manner.”528 It is because of this principle that section 36 of 
the Constitution requires that limitations of rights may be justifiable, only if they 
are authorized by law of general application.529 Therefore if broad discretionary 
powers contain no constraints, affected people will not know what is relevant to 
the exercise of those powers or in what circumstances they are entitled to seek 
relief from an adverse decision. In essence, therefore, the rule-of-law or 
constitutional-state principle must ensure legal certainty, also in the context of 
discretionary powers to be exercised by administrative officials. 
 
In the same vein as the argument supported in the Dawood case, the 
discretionary powers of the Minister and his/her delegates in terms of the 
Communal Land Rights Act are too vague and broad to adhere to the 
fundamental constitutional principle of the rule of law / constitutional state.530 As 
indicated, the Communal Land Rights Act does not give adequate guidance to 
decision-makers to exercise their powers in a manner that would protect the 
constitutional rights of the affected people. A wide range of factors must be 
taken into account when the Minister (or his or her delegate) makes his or her 
decision in awarding ownership of land or a so-called new order right.531 Yet, as 
indicated, these factors are still very open-ended in nature and this might lead 
to inconsistencies in the decision-making process. 
 
8 4 Assessment  
On the basis of the considerations discussed, the challenges against the 
constitutionality of the ministerial discretion and the lack of adequate guidelines 
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in the Communal Land Rights Act indeed bear merit. On the basis of the 
Mbatha dictum relating to the broad discretionary powers awarded to 
administrative officials, the Constitutional Court may well issue an order to the 
effect that the legislature should redraft the relevant sections of the Communal 
Land Rights Act. Mbatha further seems to imply that the constitutional rights of 
vulnerable sections of society necessarily outweigh the capacity of State 
officials in decision-making processes. This means that where constitutional 
rights have limited application only, the parameters of such rights and their 
limitations should be clearly defined and indicated in relevant laws. 
 
On the basis of the precedent set by the Dawood-decision with regard to the 
second challenge , it seems that the Constitutional Court might very well order 
that the guidelines given to decision-makers in the Communal Land Rights Act 
are vague and therefore unconstitutional. If the Communal Land Rights Act 
lacks clear and consistent guidelines to aid the decision-makers, an order 
forcing the legislature back to the drawing board may very well be expected. 
 
Indeed the Communal Land Rights Act should have contained clearer and more 
consistent legislative provisions, especially as far as the determination phase of 
the inquiry is concerned. However, the difficult question which then arises is 
how detailed the legislative instructions to the Minister can be in view of the 
very broad range of land rights and communities that may be affected by the 
Act. The text of the Act as such need not be too detailed since many of the 
instructions may be embodied in regulations issued under the Act.  
Nevertheless, simply to leave the difficult decisions arising from the Communal 
Land Rights Act’s broad scope to an administrative official is too soft an option 
for the legislature. 
 
Simply judging by the parameters already imposed by the Communal Land 
Rights Act, it seems as if the most obvious requirements for a determination 
must be that (i) the award can only be made to (traditional) communities or its 
members and (ii) only rural land can be affected. If the open-ended land rights 
inquiry is subject to further scrutiny, it may help clear up much of the uncertainty 
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that could arise in the context of the current broad discretionary powers of the 
Minister. The “scorecard” method that now so frequently features in determining 
the BEE profile of specific sectors could, similarly for instance be used here (in 
a completely different context) to determine the eligibility of a community for 
awards of a specific kind, ambit and content. A similar approach could be 
followed in relation to the identification of land to fall within the ambit of the Act. 
This would require intricate assessment on the part of the legislature, but once 
such a "scorecard" or similar evaluative instrument has been drafted, it would 
contribute considerably to establishing legal certainty to enhance the effect of 
this very important piece of tenure security legislation that is the Communal 
Land Rights Act. 
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CHAPTER 9:   CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
9 1 Introduction 
This chapter contains a discussion of the key problems identified in the analysis 
of the Communal Land Rights Act, followed by recommendations relating to 
these.  
 
9 2 Identification of Problematic Key Aspects and 
Recommendations  
It is clear from this study that the Act does not provide adequate tenure security 
for certain categories of women,532 namely daughters, widows and single 
sisters of men, because women have been awarded tenure security only 
together with their spouses. This was evident from the testimonies of many rural 
female dwellers who testified that their rights in land are seldom respected by 
some traditional authorities. Gender equality is one of the key principles in the 
South African Bill of Rights and regardless of whether people reside in rural 
settings, this principle should at all times be respected and heeded. Only then, 
will tenure security for vulnerable groups of people become a reality. This is 
also one of the stronger arguments in contesting the constitutional validity of the 
Communal Land Rights Act, although it is not used to its full potential by the 
communities contesting the Act.533 
 
The Parliamentary process in promulgating the Communal Land Rights 
Act is yet another highly contentious issue.534 If the court finds that the 
incorrect procedure as set out in section 75 of the Constitution was 
followed to pass the Bill, this might render the Act unconstitutional. Section 
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75 deals with ordinary Bills which will not affect provinces. However it is 
clear from the geographic coverage of the Communal Land Rights Act, 
that it indeed affects numerous provinces and therefore the correct 
procedure to be followed was that as set out in section 76 of the 
Constitution. 
 
The analysis above has shown that the drafting and the registration of the 
community rules before a community can be regarded as a juristic person, 
will also be an impediment for securing tenure for rural communities 
because of its time-consuming and tedious character. Although 
communities have wide discretionary power in relation to the matters that 
they want to be regulated in the rules,535 caution will have to be exercised 
to counter abuse by unscrupulous inhabitants and the local Traditional 
Authority. This can be done by building in a veto power in the Regulations 
to the Act that can be exercised by the majority of rural occupiers at 
convened meetings. 
 
Although the Communal Land Rights Act adheres to some of the policy 
principles as set out in the South African White Paper on Land Policy, 
namely the effective management of communal land and the move 
towards a rights-based approach of holding land rights, the way the first 
policy choice manifests itself in the Communal Land Rights Act, is still 
problematic. This is because traditional authorities functioning as a 
traditional council in communal areas, may act as the designated Land 
Administration Committee. Claassens and Counsins estimate that over 
800 traditional authorities operate back-to-back in these areas not all of 
them having the co-operation and respect of local communities.536 Rural 
inhabitants are especially afraid that the Traditional Council, re-constituted 
as Traditional Authority, will, despite the new composition requirements as 
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set out in the Traditional Leadership and Government Framework Act,537 
still abuse their power. According to rural dwellers this will be the case in 
allowing them to allocate land in communal areas. The Traditional 
Leadership and Governance Framework Act provides that one-third of a 
Traditional Authority must be women and other vulnerable people, such as 
the elderly or the youth. 
 
Even where the functions of the day-to-day management of communal 
land are the responsibility of the Traditional Authority, the Communal Land 
Rights Act or its regulations should contain stronger sanctions to counter 
possible abuse by the Traditional Authority. These measures will have to 
be of a drastic nature, such as removal from office without the possibility 
of reinstitution at a later stage. The payment of a hefty fine together with 
the removal from office is yet another option. Sanctions such as these 
might deter Traditional Authority from abusing their powers. 
 
The accountability of the traditional authority, who acts as the land 
administration committee of a particular community, is yet another problematic 
issue.538 In instances where a traditional authority will function as a land 
administration committee, stricter measures regarding their accountability 
towards the very community they represent, should have been provided for in 
the Act. Coupled with this concern is the fact that the Act does not provide for 
any appeal procedure when a Land Administration Committee decides not to 
convert or confirm an old order right or to award a new order right. The Act does 
not stipulate to whom a traditional authority is accountable in exercising its 
functions. This raises the question whether traditional authorities are only 
accountable upwards, that is the Minister of Land Affairs; and not downwards, 
that is, to the people whose land rights they administer? It is hoped that the 
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judiciary will address this aspect sufficiently in the pending constitutional 
challenge. 
 
The second “external” administrative organ namely the Land Rights Board, 
might also prove to be problematic. The Land Rights Board is the body which 
will advise the Minister and communities on matters of general and specific 
importance. A Land Rights Board will have eleven members, from various 
government departments and from all sectors of a particular community. The 
fact that community members are part of the Land Rights Board is 
commendable; but it is doubtful whether the other members will have the 
interest of rural inhabitants at heart. It is however clear that all the members of 
such a Land Rights Board will have to be gender sensitive as well as 
transparent in exercising their functions. Greater liaison between the Land 
Administration Committees and the Land Rights Boards is also proposed, in 
achieving tenure security. By allowing for this they can check and balance each 
other’s functions and duties. 
 
The efficacy of South Africa’s current deed registration system will be tested to 
its limits, especially since almost a third of the population resides in these 
areas. The proposed electronic deeds registration system, if implemented in 
time, will hopefully be of assistance in registering new land allocations to 
communities and individuals, as well as in registering new order land rights for 
to beneficiaries. 
 
The surveying and registration of land is by no means inexpensive, and since 
the Act proposes the surveying and registration of vast hectares of communal 
land, this exercise will be a costly affair. Budgetary allocation by the National 
Treasury for land reform has proven to be insufficient over the past couple of 
years, as it has never amounted to more than a third of the annual budget. If the 
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Communal Land Rights Act is to be implemented at scale, National Treasury 
will have to be able to award substantially more money for land reform.539 
The Department of Land Affairs will have to initiate legislative amendment to 
define the content of “new order rights” since this is a critical omission in the 
Act. Provision is made in the Communal Land Rights Act for the conversion of 
“old order rights” into “new order rights.” This is indicative of the movement 
away from the common law notion of ownership as the most absolute right 
suitable for registration, together with a few limited real rights which are clearly 
defined. This is not the case with the so-called “new order rights.” In order to 
create legal certainty as to what a “new order right” entails, this will either have 
to be substantiated in an amendment to the Communal Land Rights Act or in 
the Regulations to the Act.540 
 
The Department of Land Affairs is currently busy with two pilot projects to 
review the implementation of the Communal Land Rights Act in the North-West 
Province and Limpopo. These projects were launched already in 2006. 
Attempts to obtain more information as to the aims and objectives of these 
projects from the Department of Land Affairs, were unsuccessful. 
 
The noble aspirations of the Communal Land Rights Act will have to be 
effective in the long term. This entails that the Department of Land Affairs and 
other government departments will have to liaise to ensure that communities 
have sustainable use of their land.541 Sufficient post-transfer and continuous 
financial support as well as empowerment strategies will have to be provided. 
Olivier also proposes that a pre-transfer survey must be conducted to determine 
the current use of communal land as a starting point also for dismantling 
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conflicting land rights in these areas.542 Furthermore, the attempts of the 
Communal Land Rights Act to achieve greater intergovernmental co-operation 
call for a better definition of the role of the various departments. Currently the 
Department of Land Affairs is not adequately geared to oversee the 
implementation of the Act. Often the skills required to assist the new land 
owners, are not found in one state department only but may involve various 
other departments. Consequently, there is an urgent need to define and clarify 
the role of the various state department involved in effective land tenure 
reform.543 
 
9 3 Concluding remark 
There certainly is no question about the need for legislation to foster tenure 
security in respect of communal land in South Africa. The legislature’s attempt 
at providing this through the Communal Land Rights Act should be applauded. 
Yet, as was shown in this thesis, the provisions of the Act are fraught with 
difficulties and controversies, which goes some way to explaining why the Act 
has not yet been implemented. Until these difficulties and controversies are 
resolved, tenure insecurity is likely to be exacerbated, rather than reduced. 
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